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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Cardinal Tomasek Blames Authorities for Weakening Church

26000483 Gdansk GWIAZDA MORZA in Polish
No 8, 9-16 Apr 89 pp 1, 4-5

[Interview with Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, archbishop of Prague and primate of Czechoslovakia, by Krystyna Krauze in December 1988: "Free Us by the Truth"; place of interview not given. Article 2.3 of the censorship law dated 31 July 1981 governing the control of publications and entertainment states that items must not disagree with the "constitutional principles of foreign policy of the Polish People's Republic and its allies."]

[Text] [GWIAZDA MORZA] Your Eminence, I would like to thank you very much for the opportunity to conduct this short interview. For the last 2 days, you were in the hospital in Brno undergoing specialized medical tests, and I am, therefore, even more grateful for this meeting today.

[Tomasek] The pleasure is all mine. I am always happy to greet guests from Poland.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] There are many Polish notes in Your Eminence's life history. Could we touch briefly upon at least one of them?

[Tomasek] My life history has been rather dramatic. I lived through two world wars. During the first one, while a student, I was called into military service. I took part in the war. I served in an army that included many Poles. We often sang Polish army songs. (The cardinal hums "Oh My Rosemary" and "How Quickly Life Flows By"). I remember those songs well—they were beautiful and deep. In that kind of atmosphere, we lived through World War I. I returned from the war an invalid. That was after its conclusion in 1918. The doctor did not want to sign a certificate stating that my health was up to my beginning seminary studies. He stated that if I entered theological studies, it would be at my own risk. That is how I went to the seminary, and that is how I am serving God and approaching my 90th birthday.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] How did you become a cardinal?

[Tomasek] Attaining that honor was a great surprise to me. I never supposed I would live to be named a cardinal. In 1976, I was 76 years old. I was officially raised to the dignity of cardinal in 1977. In the same year, I was named archbishop of Prague. The one dignity swiftly followed the other.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] The head of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia has many pressing problems to solve, especially right now. Which of them is the most urgent?

[Tomasek] Recently I have had many problems and troubles related to the lack of bishops in dioceses. Right now we have 13 dioceses and only 2 of them have bishops—11 have no bishops. A diocese without a bishop is like a family without a father. Some dioceses have been waiting for a bishop for 20 or 30 years. Why? It is because when the Holy Father attempts to fill these vacancies immediately, the civil authorities have the last word in the matter and refuse to accept the candidates put forth by the Holy Father. Then the government proposes its own candidates to us. Understandably, it is difficult to reach some kind of compromise in these matters and, therefore, 11 dioceses remain deprived of bishops. Our governmental authorities have the persistent conviction that our church is not Roman Catholic, but state Catholic. One phenomenon that shows this is that candidates for the seminary must have government permission to enter the seminary. On the average, 50 to 60 percent of the candidates obtain this permission. The remainder are refused permission without any specific explanation. Similarly, priests may work in parishes only with permission of state administrative officials. Often they do not receive this permission, especially in cases in which they are recognized as individuals who actively initiate religious life in parishes. Right now we have many priests who are deprived of an appointment. They are obliged to work in normal workplaces, in factories and in construction, usually as manual laborers.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] The same problem exists in Slovakia as well. [passage deleted from original text and replaced with notation: article 2.3 of the law dated 31 July 1981 governing the control of publications and entertainment (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, item 99 together with later changes)]. What, then, is the situation of the Catholic Church in Slovakia?

[Tomasek] As far as the faithful are concerned, one can say that the situation in Slovakia approximates the one in Poland. There is a very deep Christian tradition. Churches are full, clergy are needed. As far as the Christian tradition is concerned, Moravia is like Slovakia. On the other hand, that tradition is weakest in Bohemia itself. This weakness stems from historic factors and from the current political situation as well. If you ask a Catholic in Bohemia why he believes, he will respond: "I know and, therefore, I believe." This is the result of his individual reflection, and he had to choose the Christian road for himself, conscious of what he was doing. Ask a Slovak the same question, and he will answer: "I am a Catholic because I am Slovak."

[GWIAZDA MORZA] A national tradition...

[Tomasek] You may say that...

[GWIAZDA MORZA] At the present time, are many young men seeking admittance to seminaries?

[Tomasek] Many do. But because of the required permission about which I spoke earlier, only an insignificant percentage are entering studies. Besides that, the Church also has its limits. I wish that the whole matter were exclusively in the hands of the Church.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] There are two seminaries in Czechoslovakia. One is in Litomerice near Prague and the other is in Bratislava in Slovakia. What is the current status of male and female religious orders in your country?

[Tomasek] As far as seminaries are concerned, formerly each diocese had its own diocesan seminary. There was no problem filling vacancies in parishes. In 1949, the government dissolved all the seminaries and also closed the theology department in Olomouc in Moravia. This left only two schools, one for the Czechs and Moravians in Litomir and one for Slovakia in Bratislava. Czechoslovakia is composed of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia. Thus, one-third of our republic has been deprived of a seminary. At present, about 1,500 priests are needed in Bohemia and Moravia. The situation is catastrophic. Here one priest serves in five or six parishes. Thus he cannot celebrate Sunday mass in each church as it ought to be done. With regard to access to the living Word of God, we have a certain number of men studying for the diaconate to relieve the situation in the parishes, at least in part. On the other hand, the matter of the religious orders looks much worse. In 1949, a decree was issued forbidding the acceptance of new members into religious orders. This year, for the first time since 1949, the government agreed to the acceptance of a limited number of novices into female religious orders who would be able in the future to serve in hospitals and social care facilities. The government permission does not extend to male religious orders. On many occasions, I tried to change this state of affairs. Unfortunately, my pleas were not answered.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] Yet there are religious orders in Czechoslovakia. I know that Jesuits and Franciscans are active here.

[Tomasek] Yes, that is true. They are older men, ordained before the war or while they were abroad. There are younger men among them, but these perform only an auxiliary role.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] What is Your Eminence's view of the role of the Czech Church in the European Church, and what relationship is developing between the Czech Church and the Apostolic See?

[Tomasek] Mutual relations with the European Churches are very poor and severely limited. The very act of making such contacts causes us a lot of trouble with the civil authorities. Unity with the Vatican is maintained principally through individual contacts. Official contact can exist only when a delegation from the Vatican comes to Prague to conduct talks with me or with government

representatives about questions relating to the problems and issues of the Czech Church. Thus, contacts are necessarily sporadic. They are maintained by groups of Czech Catholics living abroad, principally postwar and 1968 emigrants. The government hinders our pastoral work in our own facilities. We may not teach catechism as it is taught in Poland and certain other countries of the socialist bloc. In our country, we may teach catechism only in the state schools and only to children from grades two to seven in the elementary school. These children must be specially enrolled by their parents, and the enrollment process must be repeated each year. The hours of religious instruction are so arranged that catechism is taught at very unsuitable times: during lunch hour or late in the evening. The result is that school catechism classes have a minimal effect. A modest number of children attends religion classes. [passage deleted from original text and replaced with notation: article 2.3 of the law dated 31 July 1981 governing the control of publications and entertainment (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, item 99 together with later changes)]. We would like to hold religion classes in churches, but at present this is impossible, to put it plainly. Another of my problems is the limited possibility for publishing Catholic books and periodicals. Whenever a state office grants us permission to publish anything, we are next faced with the problem of a drastic limitation in the number of copies we may publish. These publications disappear immediately. The faithful cannot find a single religious book in the bookstores.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] What kinds of periodicals are published? How do you rate the access of the faithful to prayerbooks and breviaries?

[Tomasek] In our country prayerbooks are published in such small quantities that they do not meet the demand. We publish a weekly paper, KATOLICKE NOVINY [Catholic News], that contains only six pages, very few for a regularly published newspaper with a large (by our standards, of course) circulation. Everything we print must be submitted well in advance to the state censorship office, but its censorship may not be indicated in the copy. Every diocese also publishes a diocesan bulletin that is also subject to censorship. In addition, bishops' pastoral letters must be approved by state control offices.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] Is there a possibility that the Holy Father will visit Czechoslovakia—perhaps in conjunction with the conclusion of the beatification process of St. Agnes? John Paul II reportedly stated that the greatest possible miracle that could take place through the intercession of this saint would be for a papal visit to occur and for him to celebrate mass in St. Vitus' Cathedral.

[Tomasek] Yes. We would like very much for that to happen. However, until now there are no concrete indications of this taking place. We anticipate that the beatification process of St. Agnes will be completed next year (I think in the fall) and that the Holy Father will sign

the decree of beatification. In such a case, I plan to write a request to our president asking that the Holy Father be sent an invitation to the religious ceremonies in Prague. The pope is not only the head of the Catholic Church but also the head of the Vatican State. The possibility for a visit to us to be made by the head of another state exists only when invitation for a visit to Prague [material missing from sentence as published]. Some officials of state bodies informed me recently that I should not place too much hope on the possibility of a papal visit. On the other hand, if the celebrations take place in Rome, that will be much better for our countrymen living abroad. It will be easier for them to travel to Rome, but very difficult for them to travel to Prague.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] This year the Czech Church entered the novena period of preparation for the observance of the 1,000th anniversary since the death of St. Adalbert in 997. What is the schedule for the ceremonies associated with this novena?

[Tomasek] For us, this is a very important period of preparation for the great jubilee. There is a monthly publication that contains the program guidelines for parish priests. The goal of the novena is the renewal of religious life. In the course of the 10-year preparation for the jubilee, we intend to single out each year one of the basic problems of religious life in the contemporary world and to devote ourselves to dealing with this problem. In that way, we want to bring about a healing and deepening of the spiritual life of the Czech Church. Every novena year brings with it some important concept flowing from the teaching of the gospel of Christ and the teaching of the 10 commandments. In the light of that teaching, we want to join the promises of the new and the old. The spiritual stimuli of the novena may inspire our thinkers and artists to creative work and may bear fruit in ecumenical meetings and dialogs between believers and nonbelievers. The goal of the novena, a spiritual renewal through the intercession of St. Adalbert, likewise has a symbolic aspect. This first Czech on the throne of the bishop of Prague was at the same time the first Czech with a truly European significance. He was closely associated with the beginnings of Christianity in Poland and Hungary and, through his disciples, with the christianization of Rus as well. He was also the personal link between us and the culture of Germany and Italy, where he lived and taught. The year 1988 is the year of Blessed Agnes and of all those who consecrated themselves to the service of the sick and suffering. The coming year of 1989 will unfold under this slogan: faith in the contemporary world. It is the year of St. Clement Hofbauer and St. John Nepomucene Neumann. At the opening of the novena, I dedicated the bell of St. Adalbert. It contains the inscription: "Free us by the truth and renew the face of the earth."

[GWIAZDA MORZA] How are relations between the Catholic Church and the other Christian Churches in Czechoslovakia?

[Tomasek] We have had active ecumenical groups in operation for a long time. In this area as well, the authorities prevent us from solidifying contacts. However, these contacts are very lively—they are developing and growing. I myself make use of the guidelines for ecumenical contacts. I am aware, however, that they are usually informal and involve small groups of people.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] Then how does the religious life of young people shape up? Your Eminence enjoys great authority, not only among Catholic and Evangelical youth, but also among those that call themselves atheists. Today young people in the Church are viewed everywhere with anxiety. Your Eminence, how do you perceive this problem in Czechoslovakia?

[Tomasek] We are currently in a new situation. The Church here is reviving and growing. The religious reawakening of young people is typical of this situation. Each year brings an increase in young people. We are baptizing young teenagers and young people in their twenties, who come from atheistic homes. They approach us; they are looking for the path to God. This is incomprehensible to the government and to the Communists because the young people were brought up in a completely different ideology. But they come to us, ask to be baptized and then live an intense spiritual life and take an active part in the life of the Church as well. It is a phenomenon of our Church. Where the youth is the future is as well. As a whole, we are a Church at the turning point. There are many indications that spiritual life in Czechoslovakia is alive. The numbers of the faithful are growing. This is the result of 40 years of purgation.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] What circumstances have made the renewal possible and which social groups are the most active in this Christian renewal?

[Tomasek] The religious renewal is most evident in industrial cities, in working class districts, among the intelligentsia and among the youth as well. One senses a desire and hunger for God there. The Marxist-Leninist ideology in existence until now no longer draws them. Whoever professes his faith must be prepared for any eventuality. I am optimistic where my Church is concerned, [passage deleted from original text and replaced with notation: article 2.3 of the law dated 31 July 1981 governing the control of publications and entertainments (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, item 99 together with later changes)]. Whoever prays does much for the Kingdom of God. Whoever suffers for the Crucified does everything. Atheism is propagated officially in school, but people have a plaintive hunger for the spiritual and religious life, a hunger for the Bible. They come to us for the Holy Scriptures and breviaries. There are only enough for a few of them. And they meet together in small groups in private homes and pray from the few, precious copies they have.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] I would like to return to the problem of the autonomy of the Church from the government.

[Tomasek] In 1948, the state seized "guardianship" of the Church. It requisitioned its possessions. A Church subject to the state is financed by it. The priests became state officials in a certain sense. As I have already stated, only a person that has the state permission may become a clergyman. [passage deleted from original text and replaced with notation: article 2.3 of the law dated 31 July 1981 governing the control of publications and entertainments (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, item 99 with later changes)].

[GWIAZDA MORZA] Now I can really see how difficult Your Eminence's situation is as head of the Czech Church. I see how you are obliged to act between the lines, so to speak, and pursue a policy of taking little steps that facilitate concessions from the authorities.

[Tomasek] It is wonderful that you understand this problem. That is the way it is.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] I am under the impression that the Church in Czechoslovakia is [passage deleted from original text and replaced with notation: article 2.3 of the law dated 31 July 1981 governing the control of publications and entertainments (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, item 99 with later changes)].

[Tomasek] Very well put. They are our catacombs.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] Recently, Your Eminence had difficulties on the border bringing in religious books printed at the Vatican. Apparently, these books were confiscated.

[Tomasek] Yes. Then things were cleared up and the books were returned. There is an official directive that anyone who wants to procure books from abroad must submit a prior list of titles and authors on special forms published at the ministry. He must obtain approval from the office and must send this approval to the book publishers. Without this form, the books cannot reach the addressee.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] In addition to the vitalization of the Church, we also observe the increased activity of the opposition in Czechoslovakia. [passage deleted from original text and replaced with notation: article 2.3 of the law dated 31 July 1981 governing the control of publications and entertainments (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, item 99 together with later changes)].

[GWIAZDA MORZA] You have the stormy 28 October commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the creation of the Czechoslovak state behind you. At the present time, there are still 10 members of the democratic

opposition who were imprisoned before this anniversary who have not been released. Catholics are included among them. How did the Church react to these events?

[Tomasek] This is one of the most serious problems of the day. We are behind them. A Christian cannot exist for himself alone, but must be a Christian to others. That is our obligation. [passage deleted from original text and replaced with notation: article 2.3 of the law dated 31 July 1981 governing the control of publications and entertainments (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, item 99 together with later changes)].

[GWIAZDA MORZA] Do Catholics in prison have access to the sacraments and to the services of a priest?

[Tomasek] I am not aware of the concrete situation at this time. Something was to have changed. To my knowledge, this has not been permitted to date. But we must demand it, demand it until we get results.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] Your Eminence has the reputation of a man who holds very radical views. You enjoy a high degree of authority not only among the faithful but also among representatives of the state authorities, and among atheists operating in the ranks of the opposition.

[Tomasek] I know that, but I try to be only myself. I try to serve as best I can. I am particularly pleased that I am liked among the members of the opposition who declare themselves atheists.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] How are relations between the Czech Church and the Polish Church?

[Tomasek] They are weak. We are neighbors and I am a little surprised that there is so little contact. I wish it were different. However, I am very grateful for what the Poles do for us, especially since Czech religious books are being printed in Poland. We are truly very grateful.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] I think that we should conclude our interview. Your Eminence must be concerned about his health. In conclusion, a personal question. How is it that despite your age, Your Eminence has so much energy. Is it because you are always active?

[Tomasek] It is my duty to act. Moreover, it is a very pleasant duty. I am very happy that I have been able to live such a life. Serving God is the best thing that could have happened to me in life.

[GWIAZDA MORZA] Thank you very much for the interview.

[Tomasek] (adds in Polish) Through your mediation, I would like to extend to all the faithful in Poland most sincere holiday and New Year's greetings. We are close neighbors and I think that we will become even closer.

HUNGARY

MSZMP Budapest Reform Circle Platform *25000295b Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian* *17 May 89 p 7*

["Excerpts" from the Platform of the Budapest Reform Circle; first four paragraphs are NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] The key words and chief elements of the freedom of announcing a platform within the party are: political initiative, debate, freedom of opinion, respect for, and the right to sustain minority views, and institutional guarantees.

As part of preparing a new text for the organizational rules of procedure, party organizations and party committees debated proposals advanced by the committee charged with the preparatory work. The purpose and essence of this was to learn what kind of party the membership wants to have. The strong need for the development of party democracy and the dynamic nature of political life are indicated by the fact that small and large groups within the party prepared their own platforms, and are endeavoring to publicize them.

The CC [Central Committee] resolution which pronounced the freedom to announce platforms is in itself an indication of the fact that our party is open to any productive proposal which advances our cause; the CC and the rest of the party organs are looking forward to receiving comments. Quite naturally, NEPSZABADSAG provides space for the more significant platforms which can count on receiving nationwide attention. On this occasion we present the Budapest Reform Circle's platform in an abbreviated form, and also a relevant opinion. [opinion not selected for translation].

(The full text was adopted by the Reform Circle on 5 April so that it could be adopted as the platform of the reform movement within the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] after a nationwide debate. We called upon reform-minded MSZMP members to form local reform circles, and to organize a national conference of reform circles. At the request of NEPSZABADSAG we shortened the text by half, leaving out, among other matters, the chapter pertaining to the economy. The editorial committee established by the reform circle.)

Our Relations to the Past

1. We regard East European efforts to establish socialism as unsuccessful modernization attempts built on the Stalinist model, political power which cannot be controlled and limited, and which subjugates every subsystem of society. This model removed societies increasingly farther from the main direction of European development. By now it has become apparent that this model cannot be corrected, and that it is an historic dead-end street.

2. We reject utopian "make people happy" messianism, the idea that "the end justifies the means," which serves as the ideological and moral basis for more or less stringent party dictatorship. We are able to perceive social and economic development built on lasting and firm foundations only according to the expressed will of the nation, as conveyed through an appropriately stratified political institutional system.

3. We condemn the exclusion from public life and liquidation of coalition and opposition parties and political forces, which began in 1947 and was accomplished through undemocratic means. We support the MSZMP CC's resolution which recognizes the political reality of a multiparty system.

4. In our judgment, on 23 October 1956 a humiliated and crippled nation came into motion, exercising its fundamental right stemming from the principle of popular sovereignty. In judging the events that took place between 23 October and 4 November the following elements should be considered:

(a) The events had a revolutionary character in that they were intended to overthrow a system which led to an historic dead-end street, and to return the system to the path of European development;

(b) A fight for national liberation went on, insofar as it was aimed at the removal of Soviet armed forces regarded as the occupying power, at the discontinuation of the unilateral dependence on the Soviet Union, and at the developmental model which was alien to national traditions and features, and was forced upon the people;

(c) The events also had a strong counterrevolutionary charge, insofar as forces interested in the restoration of pre-1945 social and proprietary conditions were present and made their effect felt from the beginning;

(d) Beginning in the final days of October, White Terror appeared in an increasingly pronounced fashion. This was primarily a reaction to the autocratic terror of the previous eight years, and which rendered the taking of action against that autocratic terror significantly more difficult;

(e) In the course of events it became increasingly more difficult to underestimate the effects of those "fishing in murky waters," of the mob which robbed and lynched without political direction or content.

Summarizing all of the above, we find the single term "popular uprising" as a suitable expression to describe the events.

5. We condemn the bloody reprisal and liquidation following 4 November. We regard those fallen in the course of armed fighting on both sides of the barricades as the victims of our national tragedy, and we revere their memory.

6. We are convinced that in reality the Imre Nagy conceptual trial was an act of political assassination. We find it indispensable that Imre Nagy and his associates, together with all the victims of conceptual trials, be legally and morally rehabilitated.

7. We feel that the policies followed by the MSZMP leadership between 1962 and 1972 deserve recognition. These policies created dynamic economic development, and based on that, social peace, even though the policies were not free of contradictions. We believe that the peak of that era was the economic reform introduced in 1968. With that reform, the party leadership—without being directly pressured—turned against the logic of Stalinism within a significant sphere of social existence.

8. Consequently, however, the party's reform forces were not able to implement this policy to its conclusion. In 1972 and 1973 the leadership center formed an alliance with the increasingly aggressive conservative wing, and launched an all-out attack on reform. The policies of the past 1 and ½ decades were marked by a spasmodic adherence to power positions and, in order to hold on to power, by the avoidance of conflicts. The price to be paid for this was the total exhaustion of internal and external reserves.

9. With this policy, which cast the country into a deep economic, social, and political crisis, we denied every sense of community. The fact that in the course of that decade and a half many MSZMP members tenaciously struggled against the policy which ruined the country—sometimes risking or sacrificing their existence and personal careers—should provide a moral dimension to this statement. At the same time, we are prepared to accept our share of the responsibility, because we were, and intend to remain in the future, members of that MSZMP, in whose name these policies were pursued. With this understanding, we apologize to the nation in lieu of the party leadership which brought crisis upon the country.

10. The MSZMP membership became active in 1987 and 1988. By providing popular representation it conveyed to the leadership the increasingly severe dissatisfaction of the country's population, and forced the holding of the May party conference. There too, they implemented the popular will by partially renewing the party's leading bodies.

11. We declare solidarity with four of our comrades expelled from the MSZMP in early 1988. These are: Mihaly Bihari, Zoltan Biro, Zoltan Kiraly and Laszlo Lengyel. We look forward to welcoming them to our ranks.

12. Following a brief, temporary period of relaxation, pressure on the new party leadership increased. In response to that pressure the party leadership reached the threshold of breaking with Stalinism from the roots and in a final form, but for the time being this departure

has manifested itself only in words, and not at the level of institutions. Our goal is to institutionalize this departure and to make it irreversible.

We Want an MSZMP That...

1. We want to be the members of an MSZMP which governs by itself or in coalition, or, alternatively retreats into the opposition as one of the parties in a democratic parliamentary system, [which governs or retreats into the opposition] according to the number of mandates it acquired in free and fair elections. It is apparent that in its present condition the MSZMP is unsuitable to play such role.

2. The MSZMP is a united party. We condemn the forced fusion of parties in 1948; at the same time, however, we wish to profess the values of both the communist and the social democratic movements.

3. The MSZMP is a left-wing party. It is not only a workers' movement; we view ourselves as part of the entire international left wing, and within that of the entire European left wing. We wish to use the resources provided by the bourgeois left-wing liberal, radical, democratic, and humanist legacy. We feel that in the long term the MSZMP's joining of the Socialist International should be considered.

4. The MSZMP started off as a reform party. After the dissolution of the Hungarian Workers Party [MDP] in 1956, the MSZMP and the 7-member committee created (Ferenc Donath, Janos Kadar, Sandor Kopacsi, Geza Losonczy, Gyorgy Lukacs, Imre Nagy and Zoltan Szanto) were representatives of reform within the MDP. Six of these were executed, murdered, imprisoned or interned after 4 November 1956. We intend to return to the MSZMP's original spirit of reform.

5. The MSZMP is a Marxist party which recognizes the fact that various interpretations of Marxism have a right to exist. It organizes itself from the grass roots up, in a democratic manner. We reject democratic centralism as an organizational principle. We advocate that the party's rules of procedure being prepared:

(a) enable the holding of referenda within the party, meaning that any resolution brought by any executive body should be the subject of mandatory voting, if the body, or a certain portion of the party membership under its direction, so desires, and that the outcome of the vote be binding with regard to that body;

(b) replace the passive right to maintain a separate opinion with the active right to organize a minority opinion into a majority view;

(c) mandate only the implementation of valid resolutions, and not the expression of views that are contrary to personal convictions;

(d) revoke the prohibition on forming factions, and

(e) institutionalize horizontal structures within the party.

(6) The MSZMP is a political party. We stand up against all ideological prescriptions which have mandatory force with regard to party members. We accept Marxism as the philosophy that provides a foundation for party policies, but the criterion for belonging to the party should be only the implementation, or a manifestation of preparedness to participate in the implementation. We do not hold religious conviction as a cause for exclusion.

(7) The National Assembly and council elections are organized on a geographical basis, in contrast to the MSZMP's decisively workplace-oriented organization. Accordingly, the MSZMP should surrender its intervention into the lives and management of workplaces based on privileges and lists of authority. Paralleling this, the MSZMP should develop a viable organization on a geographical basis, which decisively follows the pattern of council and National Assembly voting districts.

(8) The MSZMP should consistently do away with the privileges it enjoys in the course of directing the life of the state and of society, its will should be enforced only through its political influence, and only to the extent of its political influence. The MSZMP should share its assets derived from budgetary subsidies with the rest of the parties, or should return the same to the state budget. It should obtain further budgetary support on the basis of equal rights shared with the rest of the parties.

(9) We want a party that functions in the open. Any party member should be able to attend the meetings of any party organ or party organization as an observer. Minutes recorded at sessions should be accessible in their entirety. The party press should become the debating forum for party members and party organizations.

From a Peaceful Transition Into Democracy and a Constitutional State

(1) The greatest obstacle in the path of reaching a social compromise is the fact that there are no institutions to accommodate the dialogue between society and those in power, and they cannot be established in the near future. Viewed from a different perspective: considering the fact that the Stalinist political system and the MSZMP's related policies have suffered an historic defeat, the party indeed possesses key positions of power without valid sanctioning by society. On the other hand, the alternative organizations also do not have the authority to conduct dialogue on behalf of society with those in power. The substance of this situation could not be changed even by advancing in time the elections. The large number of its politicians who are publicly known and are popular among various strata of society, its complete organization, and its huge financial opportunities would provide an unfair advantage to the MSZMP, while the policies of the past 40

years (and in particular of the last 15 years) would represent a hardly bearable burden. At the same time, however, neither the party, nor the alternative organizations have mature programs. Under such circumstances the results of an election would not represent the will of society, instead it would reflect society's momentary mood. Therefore, as a first step, the MSZMP and the alternative organizations must be reconciled in order to maintain the functioning of the economy, and to develop the institutions for social dialogue.

(2) The alternative organizations would be interested in such a compromise based on minimum goals, because continued deterioration of the economy or the rendering of the country as not governable conjures up the horror of "strong arm policies," meaning the armed dictatorship of a [law and] order party. The situation within the MSZMP is more complicated. For the same reason a reconciliation of this nature is also in the interest of reform forces, while it is not in the interest of the conservative wing, which is not reluctant at all to use the above-mentioned "solution." Accordingly, the decision is in the hands of the new center, referred to by Bihari as the "new [law and] order party," which clearly recognizes the necessity of a deep-rooted economic transformation, nevertheless views only as a necessary evil even the minimum reforming of the political institutional system needed to accomplish the economic transformation. Nevertheless, an objective basis for an alliance between the reform forces and a decisive majority of the centrists could be found in the fact that the attempted introduction of economic reform through the means of military dictatorship also failed in Poland in the face of societal resistance, and further, in the fact that the unusually vulnerable Hungarian economy could hardly withstand international disapproval of a conservative turn of events, expressed in the form of economic pressure. Accordingly, we find it necessary that within the shortest possible time an alliance be brought about on this basis between the center and the reform wings, and that the conservative wing be isolated, or, under fortunate circumstances, that the conservative wing break away from the MSZMP. For all these purposes we find the convening of an extraordinary party congress as the most suitable framework.

(3) The problem of drafting the constitution presents another dilemma. We agree with the position taken by the Association of Free Democrats, according to which a constitution framed prior to societal reconciliation must necessarily be a constitution forced [upon the people]. At the same time, however, the legal adoption of a constitution based on the present regulatory concepts would make it more difficult for the advocates of a conservative turnaround to act by invoking the idea of "defending the legal order," even though it would not represent a guarantee against armed dictatorship. Once again, we find the resolution of the dilemma in transition: the new constitution should be a provisional constitution, valid for the period in which the political turnaround is implemented and institutionalized. A national assembly convened subsequently should have the mission of framing a constitution, and of adopting Hungary's long term constitution.

(4) We feel that the National Committee ["Nationwide National Committee"] suggested by the New March Front would be a suitable forum in which the above-mentioned compromise could be reached. We find it important that this forum convene as soon as possible, and further, that the MSZMP declare that it will accept the agreements reached in that forum as binding, and that if necessary, it will utilize its numerical majority in the National Assembly in the interest of giving legal force to those agreements.

(5) We consider it important that the composition of the National Assembly whose mandate expires in 1990 be renewed. In the interest of achieving such renewal:

(a) the National Assembly should modify the election law by discontinuing the institution of substitute representatives, by deleting the passage which requires candidates to accept the PPF [Popular Peoples' Front] program, and by raising the number of representatives running on an at-large national slate to 50;

(b) the National Assembly should fill vacant parliamentary seats of recalled, resigned, etc. representatives through special elections, in which the MSZMP should not run candidates;

(c) the PPF National Council should make recommendations for the recall of representatives on the national slate who have discredited themselves, and

(d) the resultant vacancies in the national slate should be filled by prominent representatives of alternative parties and political organizations, called in by the National Assembly on the basis of PPF National Council recommendations.

(6) We find that to ensure peaceful transition it would be appropriate to elect the country's president of the republic as soon as possible. The person to be elected to this post should be acceptable to both sides, and should be one whose personal authority makes him suitable to play the mediator's role. The president should be nominated by the National Committee and should be elected in popular elections. He must be given an appropriately broad legal authority and jurisdiction so that he has the necessary means of power to enforce the implementation of agreements.

(7) The National Assembly elections scheduled for 1990 should be administered on the basis of an election law valid for that single occasion only, in which both the MSZMP and the alternative political organizations would be spared severe defeats in the elections. The National Assembly which convenes on the basis of this election would have as its mission the fulfillment and institutionalization of economic and political turnaround. A coalition cabinet composed of the representatives of forces interested in such turnaround should be established for its implementation.

(8) After the turnaround is brought under roof, having completed its mission, the National Assembly should dissolve itself, and should yield its place to a constitutional national assembly elected in open competition between parties and candidates. The president of the republic and the members of the Constitutional Court should resign after the new constitution is adopted.

MSZMP Ranks Reject Apparatus Dominance, Myth of Omnipotence

*25000266b Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
2 May 89 p 5*

[Report: "To Whom Does the Party Belong? Where Are the Workers? Still, the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] Has Not Broken With the Myth of Its Omnipotence"]

[Text] Party conferences were held last weekend in Bekes and Tolna counties, as well as in Sopron. MSZMP Politburo Member and CC [Central Committee] Secretary Pal Ivanyi was present at Saturday's conference in Bekescsaba.

County party committee first secretary Miklos Szabo presented the committee's report. Following the presentation, in the course of debate complaints were voiced about the fact that among the delegates dispatched to the meeting only 27 persons represented the working class, the social class for which the party stands. Several people viewed the selection of delegates to attend the conference as antidemocratic. They felt that it was too much that 80 percent of those present represented the party apparatus and was composed of other leaders.

Delegates from the intelligentsia rejected the adverse discrimination that has taken place thus far, but delegates from villages did the same. They noted that the situation of villages where the population is on the decline continues to deteriorate as long as the exploitation of agriculture and of agricultural workers continues.

At the party conference which came to a conclusion on Sunday Miklos Szabo was reelected as first secretary.

Janos Lukacs, the chairman of the MSZMP Control Committee took part in the Tolna County party conference. The conference refused to comment on a written proposal drafted by the county party committee.

It viewed the present situation of the MSZMP as not having been able to break with the myth of its own omnipotence.

The conference adjourned at dawn on Sunday. Gyorgy Janosi, director of the Szekszard Teacher's Academy was elected first secretary of the Tolna County MSZMP committee. He agreed to perform the party function in the form of social work.

Sopron too held a party conference on Saturday.

The result of that election is that Dr Jozsef Fulop, department chairman of the MSZMP Gyor-Sopron County education directorate became first secretary of the city party committee.

Social Democrats Assert Independence, Seek Assets

*25000266a Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
29 Apr 89 p 8*

[Article by Nora Rab: "MSZDP Press Conference: We Will Not Be the Opposition Inside the Court"]

[Text] At an international press conference held at the Kossuth Club on 28 April the provisional leadership of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party [MSZDP] discussed timely issues.

In reference to recent statements by MSZMP leaders, and primarily by MSZMP Executive Secretary Karoly Grosz, MSZDP party spokesman Dr Gyorgy Ruttner said that the MSZDP is intent on avoiding even the appearance of being the "opposition inside the court" to the MSZMP.

"We are just like the other independent organizations," Ruttner said. "We are willing to negotiate and to conduct dialogue only by way of the Opposition Roundtable. And just like the rest, we have no assets and are poor. When we request or demand something to be returned from the longtime assets of the MSZDP, we do not have a sharing of assets in mind, but the elementary needs which enable functioning. From the earlier 90 pieces of real estate in Budapest we would like to have at least on returned, so that we do not have to hold our meetings and discussions in private apartments and in restaurants.

The spokesman also discussed the matter of possible future cooperation with the reform wing of MSZMP. With people who follow Imre Pozsgay and Rezso Nyers, and accept their program, he said.

The press conference also dealt with this year's May Day celebrations. Together with the rest of the independent organizations and with representatives of foreign sister parties, the MSZDP will hold its functions in Nepliget. "The first free May Day since the party has revived will begin at 10:30 am in the area adjacent to the Nepliget Planetarium, and it will be an informal family event," Ruttner said.

The MSZDP will use this occasion to present the first issue of the eight page SZOCDEM NEPSZAVA. Insofar as the newspaper is concerned: Due to lack of financial resources one cannot expect regular publication, but according to their plans, desire and intention the Social Democratic NEPSZAVA will be published later as a weekly and then as a daily newspaper.

Finally, the spokesman discussed the Social Democratic function to be held in the Hungarian Optical Works culture hall on Saturday.

"It is no one's intention to oppose anyone who organizes a meeting. This is so in the sense of freedom of assembly. We are pleased that the Social Democrats are organizing this function, and we are even more pleased because at issue is the formulation of a party program. Tough debate has always been the hallmark of the party, and so is sincere tolerance. The revival of our party represents a painful, hard birth. The only matter we feel is wrong because it lacks seriousness is that the planned forum was announced as a national election rally," according to Ruttner.

Tibor Baranyai, a member of the MSZDP provisional leadership stated that the MSZDP intends to be a centrist party, the "swing vote" which holds the balance. The MSZDP advocates voting for slates of candidates and would prefer to see council elections prior to elections for parliamentary representatives.

"The MSZDP does not have slogans," Baranyai said in conclusion. "The party's ideals may be summarized in a single sentence: The path by which we can return to Europe leads through social democracy."

Socialist Work Contest Discontinued

*25000263b Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 6 May 89 p 9*

[Text] The government has discontinued the so-called socialist work contest movement, according to a notice in the 15 April issue of MAGYAR KOZLONY. The Council of Ministers rescinded its 1983 resolution concerning work contests, brought jointly with the National Council of Trade Unions [SZOT] and KISZ. According to information received from the State Wage and Labor Affairs Office, after 41 years the movement ceases to exist in Hungary. (The first work competition began at the initiative of workers in Csepel on the 100th anniversary of the 1848 revolution.) According to rules that had prevailed thus far, the movement had as its goal that workers achieve increased production and the fulfillment of plans over and above the targeted levels through voluntary offerings of labor.

POLAND

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup

*26000520 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
No 19, 13 May 89 p 2*

[Excerpts]

National News

[Passage omitted] The list of candidates nominated by the Solidarity Citizens' Committee and Lech Walesa for the Senate and Sejm were published by TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI, and GAZETA WYBORCZA.

The Episcopate Conference met. The Communique from the conference says, among other things: "The Polish bishops express the belief that the upcoming elections will be an important step along the road toward making society the subject and ending the monopoly of the 'one leader' that 'no social group . . . has the right to usurp for itself' (See encyclical "Sollicitudo rei socialis," no 15). The opportunity the elections provides should be used by the faithful with a sense of responsibility for the common good of the nation, although the awareness remains that the current elections are only the first step toward full subjecthood for society." The bishops also considered the issue of the proposed law on the protection of conceived children introduced in the Sejm and stated that "it is a law of God, which can never be revoked nor can norms opposed to it ever be established in any way." [passage omitted]

A group of unaffiliated members of the Zamosc Voivodship People's Council proposed not naming inspectors for the Worker and Farmer Inspection because it is a residue from martial law, its work is expensive, and the results are not adequate to the costs; moreover, the groups frequently lack the proper preparation. And thus Zamosc has become the only voivodship in Poland in which the Worker and Farmer Inspection is without inspectors and in fact is not in operation. (EXPRESS WIECZORNY) [passage omitted]

The Movement Against the Criminalization of Abortion has been formed at Warsaw University. It is opposed to the proposed law on the protection of conceived children. On 6 May, the movement organized a peaceful march against the law starting at the Copernicus monument; on May 10, when the first reading of the proposal is to be held at the Sejm, activists of the Movement will picket in front of the Sejm building.

District and voivodship election commissions have been named; their membership consists of 30-31 percent PZPR members, 12-13 percent ZSL members, about 8 percent SD members, and 48-49 percent unaffiliated individuals (including about 23 percent Solidarity Citizens' Committee members).

Minister Wilczek was named man of the year in a survey done by KOBETA I ZYCIE; Ryszard Kocieba, a surgeon, was second, and Jan Plocienniczak, who plays the militia Lt Col in the series "997" was third. [passage omitted]

A fire broke out on the ship Langusta in the Gdansk shipyard. Two individuals died; 15 were injured. [passage omitted]

Zbigniew Wojtczak (age 34), injured during an illegal demonstration in Wroclaw (he was struck by a militia vehicle) is returning to health; his life is not in danger.

A new weekly has appeared on the market. ZMIANY wants to be the journal of the self-governments. Janusz Ostaszewski is the editor in chief. The price of a copy is

80 zloty. In the middle of May in Poznan, the first issue of a new national monthly for children ages 6-12 titled MALY PRZEWODNIK KATOLICKI will be published. The press run is 50,000 copies.

GAZETA WYBORCZA appeared in a printing of 500,000 copies and eight columns. It is already established that the daily will continue after the election with the shortened title GAZETA. The first issue had a printing of 150,000 copies. Price 50 zloty. [passage omitted]

On the Left

M. Gorbachev at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: "A paradoxical situation—the party initiated the process of democratization; it has done much to bring these slogans to life. It has met with the widespread support of the working people and the entire nation. At present, when all of society has been moved, when the process of democratization has begun to develop in breadth and depth..., we encounter the inertia of old thinking, the desire to escape to old methods and to brake the ongoing processes with increasing frequency.... Some have even begun to panic and they see a threat to socialism, to all of our achievements, in the development of democratic processes in the country. No, comrades, we should today take care not to halt initiative from below and independence. The task consists precisely in the party leading the process of growing social activity in the people."

K. Grosz: "We are not seeking those immediately responsible for the mistakes of the past, although many people demand that. We do, however, want to create institutional guarantees to prevent the mistaken tactics from being repeated.... Neither the nation nor particular individuals are responsible for the existing situation. But those leaders who took advantage of the capabilities of a badly operating system are the ones responsible. We can never again permit the use of criminal law for judging political mistakes. For a politician there is no greater loss than the loss of the people's trust.... The party does not promise, but it is aware of its responsibility. It says openly that several years of hard work will be needed in order to make up the backlog of the lost decades."

"The Czechoslovak People's Army has 200,000 soldiers. Although the CSSR, in the coming months, will not reduce the manpower of its armed forces as, for example, Poland or the GDR have, these organizational changes will significantly affect the current structure of the Czechoslovak People's Army," reported the CTK agency. The reorganization includes 30,000 soldiers and civilian workers; a small number of professional soldiers will have to be retrained.

The Georgian press has published the first conclusions of the voluntary medical committee, which was formed to establish the course of the tragedy in Tbilisi: the wounds suffered by the participants in the demonstrations are in many cases the result of the use of sharp instruments, according to eye witnesses—shovels. Toxicological

examination has shown that in breaking up the demonstration, in addition to tear gas, unidentified chemical substances that attack the nervous system were used.

"I wish categorically to deny that we are responsible for the victims who are attributed to us," said sergeant M. Nikolov at a press conference of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs about the events in Tbilisi. "In front of us on the square there were a few men, but mostly women, in the first rows. The mob pushed them in the direction of the soldiers. We pulled our shields out of the way to let the women, children, and old people out. It appears that they were consciously gathered in the square and kept there until the end. If someone wanted to get out he was immediately, ruthlessly, and brutally pulled back." Col A. Baylanov: "Someone thought in advance about the paving stones, bricks, which were stacked up. Bottles and metal rods were flying in our direction. Even benches and trash containers were thrown at us. Several times we were literally attacked.... As a result of this action, 69 soldiers of the internal military were injured." [passage omitted]

"Common antisocialist goals and interests join the dissident groups of the socialist countries," writes the Prague weekly TRIBUNA. "The joint effort occurs primarily between dissidents in Czechoslovakia and Poland.... The so-called Polish-Czech Solidarity is nothing other than one of the weapons of anticommunism and the international reaction. Its operations aim to liquidate socialism, to torpedo perestrojka and democratization, and to create the space and conditions for efforts to implement the slogan "Europe Without Communism."

A survey in the CSSR on economic reform: 80 percent of the respondents thinks that perestrojka will help solve the problems of the economy. A majority thinks of perestrojka as a major renewal and reorganization of the economy; 75 percent of those supporting perestrojka has reservations about those who are implementing it; and about 40 percent of the respondents thinks that the current preparations for economic reform do not ensure its complete implementation; 75 percent supports accelerating the rate of economic change; 62 percent of the respondents thinks that there should be two or more candidates for every office in elections. Only 5 percent is satisfied with the current state of affairs.

Janos Kadar has been released from his position as chairman and member of the MSZMP Central Committee. The Central Committee made this decision after hearing reports on his health. [passage omitted]

Opinions

Major Andrzej Kruczkowski, head of the Prevention Section of the Katowice Voivodship Office of Internal Affairs:

(Comment during a discussion at the editorial offices of WIECZOR 26 April 1989)

"In addition to personnel problems, we have other, material ones. The militia is also feeling the economic crisis. For one patrol car we have received a limit of 3,000 kilometers, and in July we will have a shortage of gasoline. If things continue in this way, we will have to put it up on blocks. Especially since these polonezes and fiats are falling apart...."

"Perhaps bicycles then?"

"There are also no bicycles! It's embarrassing to say; there are even problems with boots! And all this is happening when the dangers from crime are increasing."

Dr Ryszard Wisniewski of the Nicholas Copernicus University in Torun:

(Interviewed by Teresa Slowinska, GAZETA POMORSKA 28 April 1989)

[Answer] I think the fundamental mistake of our left lies in the conviction that history can be planned globally based on an utopian possibility of building the perfect order, perfectly just, devoid of contradictions. This view brought dogmatism, isolation from life, schizophrenic development of theories masking the faults of practice. The Western European left, among which the social democratic parties number themselves, and also the right have proved more pragmatic, have faced reality, as the state of many highly developed capitalist countries shows. We have had a far-reaching perspective; they have solved their problems.

Prof Dr Mariusz Gulczynski of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute for the State and Law:

(Interviewed by Teresa Kwasniewska, SLOWO LUDU 28 April 1989)

[Answer] Many are convinced that we are facing a long, difficult road on the way back to capitalism. And there are those who claim that capitalism does not have a chance in Poland. For years I have been saying that if we succeeded in creating highly developed capitalism, I would be for it. But we would face peripheral, backward capitalism dependent and exploited by domestic capitalists and foreign capital. I see no chance of pushing Poles with hunger, unemployment, dictatorship, etc., as for example in South Korea, which has jumped into partnership positions with the leading highly developed countries. Thus, I think that socialism is our chance, but civilized, drawing on the civilizational achievements of mankind including capitalism.

Dr Piotr Winczorek of Warsaw University, SD activist:

(Interviewed by Stanislaw Mienkowski, KONTAKTY 23 April 1989)

[Answer] To be sure, the existing parties have constitutional reinforcement, but in fact there is no legal act that provides answers: what is a party, how is one to be formed, is it a legal person, how is it to be financed, and

in what circumstances can it be delegalized? Without answers to these questions, we are condemned to interpretative manipulations. We must put all these things in order, especially since the formation of other parties with different backgrounds and widely different political options in the near future is to be expected. The SD was the first to call for the adoption of a law on political parties. Housecleaning in the party backyard is absolutely essential; for without it, the upcoming elections to the Sejm and Senate will remain in question and doubt.

Prof Wanda Kaszauskiene, director of the Institute for Party History of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania:

(From comments for the Vilno CZERWONY SZTANDAR 22 April 1989)

"We were the first of the Baltic historians who acquainted themselves with the materials prepared in Moscow. This is shown by the fact that the CPSU Central Committee understands the efforts of the republic party organizations and the demands of society to give a political judgment of the agreements between the USSR and the Germans of 23 August and 28 September 1939 and of their supplementary secret protocols.

In Moscow, it is already admitted that the mentioned protocols existed. But until now, as you know, their existence was denied in every possible way. We reached agreement that the entire course of the events confirms what was established in the secret agreements. This is an important point!

Marian Orzechowski, member of the Politburo and secretary of the PZPR Central Committee:

(Interviewed by Zygmunt Rola, PERSPEKTYWY 5 May 1989)

[Answer] Not everyone enthusiastically supports what happened at the 10th plenum of the PZPR Central Committee. This also applies to the steps toward finally liquidating the remains of stalinism. The results of surveys show that from 70 to 90 percent of the respondents, depending on their social group, accepts those resolutions. Even if we adopt the most optimistic variant—90 percent acceptance—that means that there are 200,000 members of the PZPR who do not support the decisions of the 10th plenum.

Kwasniewski, Michnik Offer Interpretations of National Events

26000545 Warsaw ITD in Polish
No 21, 21 May 89 pp 4-5

[Unauthorized statements by Aleksander Kwasniewski and Adam Michnik compiled by Piotr Gadzinowski during a political meeting sponsored by Club Impuls on 3 May 1989 in the assembly hall of the Department of Humanities, University of Gdansk: "Fragments of a Report"]

[Text] Time, place, and nature of event: 3 May 1989, auditorium of the Department of Humanities, University of Gdansk. A public political meeting.

Inspirers and organizers: Impuls Club of the not yet legalized NZS [Independent Association of University Students] and the legal authorities of the University.

Participants in the event: Nearly a thousand persons of both sexes, mostly students and faculty, including Rector Czeslaw Jackowiak, and:

Aleksander Kwasniewski, 34 years old, economist by profession, youth activist. Present "occupation": minister of state (since 1985), chairman of the Committee for Youth and Sports and the Sociopolitical Committee of the Council of Ministers. Participant in roundtable. Candidate for senator from Koszalin Voivodship.

Adam Michnik, 43 years old, historian by profession, means of support not closely known. "Antisystem" activist, publicist in so-called second circulation [underground press]. Multiple offender. Participant in roundtable. Candidate for deputy from Silesia.

Nature of event: legal.

About the Date of Elections Being Too Soon

Adam Michnik: "I support the argument that this date is highly unfavorable to our chances, because without access to mass media our opportunities for advocating our side are limited. Moreover, I am quite cautious and skeptical about the strength of the roundtable faction of the PZPR. Analysis of the discussion at the 10th PZPR Central Committee Plenum indicates that opponents of solutions based on pluralism were in the majority. The roundtable agreement made the relegalization of Solidarity dependent on the date of the elections. This is a tremendous step forward, a great accomplishment which has to be consolidated. What matters most in these elections is not the number of parliamentary seats allocated to Solidarity but the fact that people finally will be free to elect 35 percent of the seats as they wish. We were asked to agree to a common list of candidates, however this may be interpreted, with a certain proportion of seats in the Sejm and the Senate to be set aside for us, in return for our concurrence. We risked being tarred and feathered in the factories."

Aleksander Kwasniewski: "I agree that what we created at the roundtable is new, fragile, and pregnant with unknown consequences. But it also represents a great and historic experiment resolved upon by the most rational forces on both sides of that table. The 'round table' discussion was a dialogue between what are undoubtedly significant forces, but it had neither legal nor formal foundations. We on our part had a difficult discussion with the Sejm, having to answer its questions as to why the decisions of the roundtable should be respected, considering that it was an extraparliamentary body and its sole importance was in the moral-political domain. The electoral campaign may seem 'too soon' to both sides but it has one great advantage: we are rapidly switching from the roundtable stage to the stage of

political institutions, which will serve to promote the proreform orientation in the Sejm and the Senate and thereby also resolve its parliamentary aspects through new legislation and the exploration of optimal solutions. Yes, there is little time left before the elections, but Mr Michnik's complaint is hardly justified considering that the Opposition has at its disposal a program consisting of just one word, Solidarity, which is an attractive electoral symbol. I would tremble if the results of the elections would be such that one side or the other would win by a landslide. The Sejm and the Senate should contain representatives of various domestic constituencies. Domination by one side, replacement of one monopoly with another, would be just as disadvantageous as the situation we had experienced in the past."

About the Opponents of the Roundtable

A. Kwasniewski: "For many reasons I am cognizant of the power of that faction within the party which distances itself from the roundtable agreements. This situation may have its counterpart within Solidarity, where judgments also are not unanimous. Therefore, viewing this objectively, the "firming" of these changes is "politically" extremely important. I do not know if you already are aware of the changes in the quality of the laws governing elections to the Sejm, free elections to the Senate, and trade union pluralism. All these events are pregnant in major consequences."

A. Michnik: "I do not accept this kind of symmetry with opponents of the roundtable within the government coalition being balanced by opponents within the opposition. My reason is because the opponents within the government coalition are the kind of people whose philosophy is, roughly speaking, that since the roundtable represents a creeping counterrevolution, all the 'table' participants should be packed off to jail, with me and you, Mr Minister, being placed behind the bars too. By contrast, within the opposition there are persons who believe that all jails should be shut down tomorrow. This is a less realistic postulate, but still the extremists on both sides are not comparable in ferocity."

A. Kwasniewski: "All extreme views have their own specificity, but you are perfectly aware that in the present political situation this is an unusually crucial problem. The fury of your extremists provides encouragement to our opponents."

A. Michnik: "If there is anything I am afraid of it is a situation in which we in the opposition might not reach mutual agreement and establish mutual rules for the roundtable, as then the radical wing of Solidarity or the student movements might play a role similar to that of the extremist radical groupings in Chile while Allende was in power—groupings that were not strong enough to seize power, but sufficiently strong to destabilize the system, so much that the overthrow by the military was received with relief by a substantial segment of the public."

A. Michnik's Promise Made to A. Kwasniewski

"I'll teach you how to smuggle messages [in jail]."

On the International Context of the Changes in Poland

A. Michnik: "All the previous attempts at reform also lost owing to the international context. This is the first time that the international situation is so favorable. This opportunity should not be wasted. One's heart swells when he reads Soviet newspapers, when traditional dogmas are being questioned in Moscow. Seen from this standpoint, the road we are entering upon is important as a test case of transition from totalitarian Stalinist barracks communism to parliamentary democracy. The changes in the USSR are so far-reaching that it is precisely the opposition that should reconsider its traditional anti-Soviet rhetoric. Now such rhetoric is becoming barren and cannot answer the questions formulated by the changing reality. It will also be good if the other side abandons its pro-Soviet rhetoric, [its officialese propaganda of] ceremonies, anniversaries, gala commemorations."

A. Kwasniewski: "A transition from a zoological [as published] to a rational stance is needed, as is transition from a fawning to a realistic stance [toward the USSR]. The road awaited by that other side [the USSR], too, has to be located. The idea is hardly of making a lady [the USSR] happy by showering her with compliments. The USSR is of a certainty concerned about the stability of Poland. Its positive reaction to our Polish experiments and to the experiments in Hungary demonstrates an unblinkered perception of the new political landscape, of the reforms creating a yet unknown but sought-after formula for a socialist, democratic state. But let us have no illusions: to the USSR politically it is the party [the PZPR] that is the natural partner. It will still be a long time before Solidarity is viewed as the principal ally of the USSR in Poland, and this situation has to be accepted. The reciprocal experience of socialist countries in reforms is unusually inspirational, but it is the change in the economic system that is decisive to our reforms. In this sense we are most impotent, as can be seen from the results of the roundtable. Politically we have advanced very far, with more reforms being predicted in the judiciary and local governments. But so far as the economy is concerned, we created a package of economic dilemmas."

On Unemployment

A. Michnik: "Experiments of this kind should be tried on animals or on a table. I would feel lousy if I were unemployed. In Poland unemployment may be a bad, inevitable consequence of certain solutions, but it is not a prescription, unless it is proposed by somebody who does not want to be unemployed himself or who has visited the United States and is aware of the high unemployment benefits paid over there."

A. Kwasniewski: "I envy my counterparts in the opposition for the ease with which they are defending the rationales of our system of society. However, the issue is

more serious. Unemployment cannot be treated as an end in itself; that would be a kind of economic sadism. Yet, this possibility cannot be precluded when we speak of restructuring the economy. An answer has to be sought at present to the question of the extent to which trade unions are ready to accept such negative consequences as cyclic or even structural unemployment, along with a system of unemployment benefits and vocational retraining. This is one of the economic dilemmas I have mentioned. There exist many questions as to how we can conceive pursuing an entitlements policy in a situation in which the coffers of the state are nearly empty and must remain empty for some time if we want to convert to the new economics [market forces]."

On Political Power

A. Kwasniewski: "It is untrue that the authorities exercising political control over various domains of life are better off than the opposition, which is neither burdened by the past nor handicapped by responsibility for the situation. This was obvious during the roundtable, when the coalition-government side was consistently in favor of pluralism and its allies said what would please their own base of support. We on the coalition-government side were awed by the opposition-Solidarity side which acted like a regular, well-disciplined, united, and cohesive Bolshevik party with an explicit central leadership group. By contrast, neither the government nor the PZPR is a monolith. By its very nature, the coalition-government side comprises a variety of orientations. It is no simple matter to work out a uniform concept accepted by its factions."

On General Jaruzelski

A. Michnik: "You surely remember that as late as a year ago I was saying that Gen Jaruzelski's resignation was a prerequisite for any change to the better. I had said that Gen Jaruzelski is a prisoner of his own history, that he is incapable of ridding himself of martial law mentality, sitting down at the table with Solidarity and reaching a compromise. Well, I must now publicly admit that I was wrong. At a crucial moment in history Gen Jaruzelski proved capable of a far-reaching reorientation, and his stance deserves respect regardless of how one may judge his previous policy. I myself have not changed my negative appraisal of that policy."

A. Kwasniewski: "Following 13 December 1981 [the imposition of martial law] forces believing that the opposition could be liquidated had prevailed in many places. Elsewhere [in the ruling circles], however, all that time it was believed that progress could not be achieved without national reconciliation. And this stance of Gen Jaruzelski is not just a consequence of the last few months."

On the Nomenklatura [Ruling Elite]

A. Kwasniewski: "A very good definition of the nomenklatura was provided by Michal Ogorek in PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY: 'Something absent which we, however, are continually refining.' But it also means the

principle that a nonparty member may not become first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee. The problem must be approached dynamically, especially in the economy. We agreed at the roundtable that the list of enterprises of special importance to national security will be radically cut. But this does not mean at all that these enterprises are to be staffed with misfits from the nomenklatura; what it means is simply that at these enterprises the state has the say in appointing the managers. The problem of the nomenklatura will be resolved by the consequences of the economic and political reforms, as a result of abandonment of the leading role of the party, limited to the nomenklatura, and arrival at democratic solutions."

A. Michnik: "Let us call a spade a spade. The nomenklatura is a social stratum which will defend with teeth and claws its status and privileges. They are unwilling to surrender their power, but we shall be the victors. If, however, reforms in Poland are to be made irreversible, something has to be done in order to make at least part of the nomenklatura interested in the changes."

On the Political Nature of Solidarity

A. Michnik: "The relationship between Solidarity as a trade union and Solidarity as a civic movement is fluid, and there is no ready-made formula for it. The rebirth of pluralism in Poland may occur in two ways. Either the [prewar nationalist] National Democrats and Christian Democrats as well as the [refounded] PPS [Polish Socialist Party], etc., are going to be on center stage, or we think realistically and the groupings active in Poland during the last 15 years will operate. The return of Solidarity to the legal scene has been shored up by the political reforms such that now the Sejm and the Senate are going to be the places for resolving political disputes and a general strike will no longer be the sole form of political expression. Now nonrevolutionary changes have to be tried out, because Poland cannot afford another civil war. A situation has arisen that I would tentatively term 'the Spanish variant'—the possibility of establishing a democratic order of society by means of peaceful, nonrevolutionary changes such that the Polish state will cease to be the property of the nomenklatura and will become our common property."

On the New Monarchy

A. Kwasniewski: "Since you are referring to that interesting Spanish example, I have a question I am afraid to ask: Do you already have a candidate for the king?"

A. Michnik: "Why not. In fact, he is living not far from here. We have Walesa, who is a kind of national treasure such as is not available in any country of real communism."

A. Kwasniewski: "You surprised me with not just one person but an entire dynasty [as published]."

On the Difference Between the Antisystemic and Intrasystemic Opposition

A. Michnik: "A prerequisite for progress is opening the gates of the linguistic prison. The difference between both terms is artificial."

A. Kwasniewski: "I am terrified when 19th-century language not fitting particular present-day conditions is employed in discussion. The changes currently under way in the socialist countries are based on pragmatic solutions. Common experience should be utilized instead of relying on concepts from the past. We are living in a period of historic changes, entering upon a new stage of coexistence, the formation of an efficient economy and a modern state with room for a new system."

A. Michnik: "I still am ignorant of the nature of this socialism which has been defended for so many years and which still is to apply. I do not know what it means nowadays to be a socialist or to be against socialism. I am incapable of understanding this conceptual apparatus. I am afraid that this is too deep for me, and therefore at my death I still will be a nonparty person."

On the Relations Between the Discussants

A. Michnik [to the audience]: "Perhaps you are upset because Mr Minister and I did not sling mud or sh.. at one another; that would have been more interesting. As for the lady who reproached us with being too conciliatory, the worst thing I wish her in her life is precisely the fact that we did not sling much mud at each other. But seriously, I wish that my associates and Minister Kwasniewski's 'comrades' would always converse in the same manner we did today, without mud and sh., and without the mediation of police interrogators."

YUGOSLAVIA

Composition of Slovene 'Healthy Forces' Viewed
28000114 Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene
7 Apr 89 pp 8-11, 60, 61

[Article by Mirko Poglajen: "'Cosa Nostra' or Masonic Lodge?"]

[Text] The Slovene political scene consists of three policies: the party-liberal policy, the conservative healthy forces, and the alternative policy of the new unions, associations, and part of official policy, primarily the ZSMS [Socialist Youth League of Slovenia]. There are two arguments supporting the assertion that the party-liberal policy is the key one today for Slovenia. The first says that it is the first official policy in the history of Yugoslav socialism that has articulated a liberalistic concept of power and has legalized the idea of a pluralistic society. The second stresses that the party-liberal policy is realistically the only policy that makes

possible a continued transition from the old to the new, and consequently the continuity that is necessary in order for changes to be carried out in a legal and reformist manner, and without the violent upheavals that threaten people's freedom in the first type.

What are the prospects for the party-liberal policy? They lie in a triple dilemma. On one side, they are faced with the offensive by the new Serbian communism; on another, with the secret lodge of the Slovene healthy forces; and on a third side, with the alternative Slovene policy. Many steps taken by the liberals indicate that they are trying to balance themselves adroitly within this triad. The time for balancing is running out, however, and the time for decisive measures is approaching. The liberals are still hesitating, however. The key question is whether there is a deliberate policy behind this hesitation that is waiting for the right moment, or whether that hesitation is the result of their impotence, unreadiness, incompetence, or a failure to understand the real political situation.

Russian Political Profile

If we judge by their current political statements, in which they say that "The most important thing in Slovenia today is to retain the degree of sovereignty and autonomy that has already been achieved," then we could say that their hesitation is the result of unreadiness and a lack of understanding. In fact, it is an axiom of all politics that what has been achieved can only be retained through constant progress. Politics knows only progress or decline, but not a status quo, that great illusion of our party liberals. If we were to judge by their representatives, of whom there are few, especially in the key positions of power, then we could say that their hesitation is the result of incompetence. If we were to judge by the circumstances of social and political power, we could say that their hesitation is the result of impotence.

Their impotence is the power of the Slovene healthy forces. The power of the Slovene healthy forces lies in their 40-year rule. It has taught them everything, and above all it has strengthened their desire for the power that they carried like destiny into the new postwar system. What is their political profile like, and who are their most famous representatives, among whom we can seek the Slovene Morinas, Bilaks, and Jaruzelskis?

It is the generation that is familiar with the corridors and textbooks of the Dzerdzinsky Academy (seven people went to the Dzerdzinsky Academy in the Soviet Union, where they learned the methods of the security service: Zan More, Mitja Ribicic, Franc Pirkovic, Vlado Kadunc, Maks Winkler, and Dusan Bravnicar; some of them were the chief interrogators in the Dachau trials).

It is the generation that learned by heart the VKP-b short course, for whom it was mostly the only primer in terms of which that generation perceived the organization and functioning of human society. That is why it was natural for them, who were nothing and wanted to become

everything, that all means were justified to achieve the final goal—the seizure of power. If the beginning of World War II and the establishment of the Liberation Front indicated that that generation, despite everything, respected the democratic rules of the game, the Dolomite Statement crushed all those hopes. A quotation from the Dolomite Statement shows that very well:

“The vanguard role in the Slovene liberation movement belongs, in view of its program, organizational structure, strategy, and tactics, to the Communist Party of Slovenia [KPS], as the vanguard of the most progressive part of the Slovene social order—the Slovene proletariat. All three groups (that is, the KPS, the Sokoli, and the Christian socialist group—author’s observation) declare that the KPS and its leadership have also proven the Party’s vanguard role in practice through its correct political line and its organization of the Slovene people’s liberation struggle.

“The others among the constituent groups of the Liberation Front are not organizing independent parties or political organizations. In accordance with their national, political, and social aspirations, which are identical with the aspirations of the KPS concerning all fundamental issues, they do not feel and do not see any need for separate parties or political organizations of their own.”

The party, which constituted the operative body of the healthy forces during the time after this statement and all during the war, eliminated all possible opponents after the war. First of all it carried out a nationalization, and put all of society in a position of dependence upon the state, which was overseen by the party. Then it took on the rest of its opponents as well.

The harshest was the extrajudicial destruction of the Slovene Domobrans [Home Guards]. It is hard to imagine the arguments that led those who accepted them into such inhumanity. Nevertheless, when we consider the possible “military or political” reasons, it becomes clear that the desire for revenge against former political and military opponents was probably the decisive argument. After the leading Slovene Bolsheviks had bathed themselves in the blood of 10,000 people, it was easier and easier from that point on. Only the beginning is difficult.

The numerous graves in Kocevski Rog, however, were filled in the greatest secrecy (as stated by Simo Dubajic, in *MLADINA*’s issue 11 of 1989, the dirty “technical” work was also done by certain non-Slovene military units). That is why it was also necessary to demonstrate to the Slovene population publicly and in the most tangible way how Slovenia would be governed and how the authorities would eliminate their potential political opponents. After the death of 10,000 people in Kocevski Rog came the organization of the judicial murders known as the Dachau trials—a real trifle, to be sure. The Dachau trials were actually public: loudspeakers were placed along the city streets, Ljubljana Radio broadcast

directly from the trial, and journalists from SLOVENSKI POROCEVALAC and LJUDSKA PRAVICA were present at the trial. The news from the trial was on the front pages, together with photographs of those being tried. The “media portrayal” and the coverage of the Dachau trials had a purpose, of course. Specifically, the Slovene authorities fully copied the guidelines of Stalin’s public prosecutor, Vyshinski, who stated, “The news carrying the verdicts must penetrate into the awareness of the masses and take hold of their hearts and brains.”

The coverage of the Dachau trials penetrated the awareness of the Slovene masses, and took hold of their hearts and brains. After the trials it was clear to everyone in Slovenia what kind of fate could await him. Anyone could be guilty, sentenced to a lengthy prison sentence, or even killed, who 1) knowingly opposed the party line; 2) objectively, and thus unconsciously, acted against the party line as assessed by the party itself; or 3) was recognized by the party as someone capable of becoming a potential opponent of it in the future.

The coverage of the judicial murders from the Dachau trials made an impression for several decades upon the Slovene masses, upon their hearts and brains—not only as a memory, but also as a warning. Those trials finally completed the establishment of the party dictatorship, which was no longer threatened by anyone from the outside, from then until the late 1960’s.

With the intimidation, persecution, and imprisonment of the Slovene intelligentsia, the Slovene authorities also appeased the deeply embedded inferiority complex that they had always felt toward the intelligentsia. In spite of the fact that they had become everything and that they had previously been nothing, they still felt deep within themselves that they could never overtake the intelligentsia as a social stratum in the social and cultural sense.

Intrigue Behind the Scenes

Another goal that the Slovene authorities achieved with the Dachau trials was the political engineering by which they settled scores with their political opponents. All of the victims in the trials were actually accused of cooperating with the Gestapo. From then on, any cooperation with the enemy, and especially with the “hostile emigres,” was a crime above crimes. After the year 1948, the Slovene party leadership used accusations of “cooperation with the hostile emigres” as the crowning argument for discrediting and eliminating its political opponents. There is almost no case of a settling of political scores in postwar Slovenia in which the argument of “cooperation with the hostile emigres,” which naturally completely discredited the individual, did not appear when all the other arguments failed. Among the more significant attacks in which that argument was used, we can mention those against Kocbek, Kavcic, and finally, the trial of the Ljubljana Four.

The first great advantage of the healthy forces is that they do not appear on the public political scene. At home, they are behind the scenes. The way in which they act is most similar to the functioning of the Mafia and secret lodges, something which they learned in their prewar party activity and in their VKP-b years. The Slovene oligarchy ensures its influence outside of the legal political institutions, through the people whom it appoints and dismisses. Any direct confrontation with them is impossible. You will not meet the Slovene oligarchs in public, and you cannot confront them publicly. They do not appear in public, they do not speak, and they do not engage in polemics, but only keep silent. They only surface when they are settling scores. They thus kill two birds with one stone. On one hand, they are uncatchable, and on the other, they are primarily putting pressure on the liberals with their silence. Those, on one hand, do not want to outline their positions clearly and expose the healthy forces, and on the other, are tactically (or sincerely) flirting with their positions and are therefore sustaining the main blows from the Slovene alternative policy. It is therefore not surprising that nearly all the polemics are between the liberals and the alternatives. Many people are also deliberately inciting this, and in that way pushing the liberals closer to the conservatives. That is the reason for the position that is rather popular among Slovene liberals, i.e., that the alternative policy is not attractive to them because it is hungry for power. They do not see that because of their own indecisiveness and tactical maneuvering, they are protecting the healthy forces, instead of exposing them and subjecting them to public criticism. A little while ago, for instance, even LA REPUBLICA wrote that a delegation from the old guard in the party visited Kucan and seriously warned him that it did not agree with his policy. It is known that that delegation included, among others, Sergej Kraigher, Vinko Hafner, France Perovsek, Nace Volj, Pavle Bojc, Rudolf Hribernik, Stane Potocar, and Bogo Gorjan. The Slovene public does not know anything about that, however; the fight is going on behind the closed doors of party offices.

Their second advantage is that the prevailing political language is the language of the healthy forces, and that the liberals cannot and will not abandon it. Consequently, the liberals are continually losing in political discussions, if for no other reason than because they are always in jeopardy that someone will observe that they are saying one thing (like everyone) and doing another. That is why it is happening today that the key party document on renewal is being publicly promoted by those who are technically the lowest party officials, and that they also include the most able and ardent adherents of the party liberal wing. In spite of many new and bold public statements, however, the liberal champions are engaging in tactical maneuvers, leaning first in one direction and then in another, and leaving many doors open for themselves.

The third great advantage of the healthy forces is that the ruling principles of political work and of the system are

on their side. These are, primarily, party monism, democratic centralism, and the new centralized federal constitution... The healthy forces are counting on the inertia of the apparat, on the orientation toward the hierarchy and the established activity of the political machinery, and on its fear of reforms, which bring uncertainty and accountability. On the other hand, the Slovene healthy forces, by definition, can only exist as a branch of a Yugoslav centralized party state. That is why their vocabulary, precisely when they are articulating the conflicts in Slovenia and their attitude toward the liberals, is similar to the program of the new Serbian communism. The healthy forces are taking shots at the liberals with Yugoslavism, separatism, nationalism, and the interests of the working class of Yugoslavia. The liberals remain helpless when this happens. They are placed in a position in which they cannot raise arguments against them clearly, because that would immediately—at least, they are convinced of this—discredit them in the eyes of Yugoslavia.

Their fourth advantage is unscrupulousness. Their motto, which has profited them on many occasions, is that the end justifies the means. According to them, morality and ethics are condemned to the petit bourgeois lumber room. An example which gives a practical illustration of their morality is Lojze Briski and his contribution in the Zebot case:

Memorandum of Discussion of the Ciril Zebot Problem

On 9 August 1968, in room 68 of the offices of the president of the Executive Council of the Slovene Assembly, a discussion was held on the Zebot problem, with the participation of comrades Lojze Briski, Franjo Turk, Drago Cop, and Stane Marinic.

The discussion noted the possibility of political problems in connection with the anticipated visit by Zebot to Ljubljana.

Ciril Zebot is not on the list of war criminals, but certain elements in his journalistic activity, especially certain excerpts in the book "Slovenia Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," make it possible, in the opinion of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs, to prosecute him for slander and hostile propaganda.

The following was agreed upon:

1. Ciril Zebot will be allowed to cross the state border if he has his travel documents in order;
2. The Secretariat for Internal Affairs, within the scope of its authority, will monitor his conduct and activity;
3. If Zebot comes into contact with the Secretariat for Information, its employee Drago Cop will familiarize himself with the program of his talks at the Ljubljana

Economic Research Institute, and at the same time warn him about the delicacy of his position and the correctness of his conduct during his stay in Slovenia;

4. In the event of any incidents whatsoever, the Secretariat for Internal Affairs will take steps within the scope of its authority.

Recorded by Stane Marinic
Ljubljana, 9 August 1968

Counterprogram

The healthy forces know that they can count on victory only in the event that they are successful in preventing a coalition between the liberals and the alternatives, halting the process leading toward Slovene national and state sovereignty, and accomplishing the restoration of the system. One should know that in addition to political convictions, they are also protecting their material privileges, which are not small. They are prepared to do literally anything for that purpose. The creation of the Ljubljana trial is a trifle for them, and that is why they are hindering and rejecting the work of the assembly commission that is studying the circumstances of it. This is shown by their opposition to the meeting and the statement against the state of emergency in Kosovo in the Cankar House, and here are the roots of the vote by the Slovene delegates in the Yugoslav Assembly in favor of the state of emergency, and Dolanc's report at the 30 March 1989 session of the Slovene Assembly on the need for the state of emergency. It is shown by every reappearance of the problem of attacks upon the Yugoslav People's Army [YPA] in Slovenia (which weaken the position of the liberals and alternatives), and thus the latest attempts to criminalize the official and alternative Slovene policies in connection with how they are represented in the FEC report on the attacks against the YPA, in which Zemljarić also participated. It is shown by the opposition to political pluralism, and consequently Dolanc's opposition to the establishment of new unions.

The healthy forces are writing a counterdocument to the key document in the history of the Slovene party, the document on the renewal of the Slovene LC. This is shown by the opposition of Andrej Marinc and Stane Markić to clear formulations concerning Slovene sovereignty, self-determination, and the right to secession at the session of the Constitutional Commission.

What about the liberals? If they decide upon a coalition with the healthy forces, then it will not be any kind of coalition, but rather a crossing into the other camp. That will be the end of their political program. If they decide on a coalition with the alternative policy, then the chances of their own policy will be incomparably greater. Only then will the conditions be fulfilled for a clash between the two opposing party concepts. Yes. A coalition with the alternative policy will only make possible a

clash with the healthy forces. That is only the first condition for reform, which by no means indicates its expiration. The possibilities and variants for it will only be opened up by this.

It is important for the alternative policy to be familiar with the situation on the Slovene political scene, and to know that in the final analysis Slovenia's fate will be determined in Slovenia. This means that in the event of criminalization it will be prohibited by Slovene officials, and if their political representatives are arrested, that work will be done by Slovene internal security officials and their godfathers from the ranks of the healthy forces. The opening up of political room for it and its increasingly greater legitimation should therefore be understood as a hand being offered by the liberal policy. The steps that it takes must be well-planned and decisive, since there is a great deal to be lost. Consequently, it is necessary to take the hand being offered, just as it is necessary to accept the rules of that association. The key point of those rules must be the joint determination of the partners that the outcome of the liberal reform will be consistent with the results of free and general elections.

[Box p 10-11]

The Great Masters

The following names could also be added to the former Slovene revolutionaries and politicians who also have influence upon political events in peacetime: Sergej Kraigher, Lidija Sentjurc, Ivan Macek Matija, France Popit, Janez Vipotnik, Mitja Ribicic, Vinko Hafner, Pepca Kardelj, Vida Tomsic, and Viktor Avbelj. They are assisted by a larger satellite group of colleagues from their generation, such as Bogo Gorjan, Janez Japelj, Nace Voljc, Roman Albreht, France (Tone) Perovsek, Sveto Kobal, Milan Vizintin, Marjan Lenarcic, certain retired generals, etc. An analysis of the careers of those people, their public statements in the past and today, the stories of their contemporaries, and archival documentation, suggests the conclusion that the most influential among them are Sergej Kraigher, with the assistance of Lidija Sentjurc, and Ivan Macek Matija, with the assistance of France Popit. Each of them has his own interest group within the circle of old revolutionaries, which is also supplemented by personnel in operational work. The following scheme, which has just emerged on the basis of an analysis of public statements, stories by contemporaries, and archival material, approximately illustrates the current distribution of forces of the personnel who for the last few decades have ruled and still rule Slovenia and parts of Yugoslavia.

Both interest groups cooperate relatively well overall, and the mutual cooperation between individual personnel in both groups is even better. It even happens that individuals in various lower personnel arrangements, for example, at the opstina level, do not even know precisely which group they belong to. That only becomes clear to

them when they make their first mistake. Rare individuals have managed to go over to the liberals, primarily those who do not have in their backgrounds "anything to hold them with." There are also a few who have taken a walk.

These are people who on many occasions have really also advocated the common interests of Slovenia, as well as the more progressive variants of development within Yugoslavia. The logic of political systems without competition, however, is inexorable. All power, in fact, is corrupted, and without free elections the populace cannot replace such power. This is particularly true because the public can only perceive the surface of personnel occurrences, whereas the real decisions take place in the background.

Restructuring and adaptation to the new political climate have not bypassed the old personnel circle, of course. They thought that general conclusions and declarations, and an informal liberalization, would not threaten their positions, and that the most significant influence lay in the bodies that implement programs and oversee the authorities' key instruments: at this time, primarily the Constitutional Commission, the Council for Protection of the Constitutional Order, the Slovene Presidency, delegations to sessions of the Slovene Assembly, the Slovene delegation to the LCY Central Committee, the Constitutional Court, etc. They have a majority in those bodies. Tone Persak, a member of the Constitutional Commission, thus stated in a television broadcast from Zarisce on 29 March 1989 that the proposals discussed in the LCY Central Committee document on renewal had not been adopted in the proposed draft of the constitutional amendments.

It would be criminal to accuse the old personnel circle and its younger operational base as a whole of betraying national or democratic interests, etc. There are also great differences among them precisely with respect to the issue of relations between Slovenia and Yugoslavia. Some of them even contributed to the processes of liberalization in Slovenia. It is true that at the moment of a serious threat to their real influence in politics and the government (including, of course, privileges, inviolability, and the interpretation of semipast political and economic defeats) some of them would know how to play the Yugoslav card of a state of emergency, and in that sense the warning by Slavoj Zizek in the latest issue of MLADINA, under the title of "Proposal for the Arrest of Milan Kucan," and the commentary by Janez Jansa in the next to the last issue of that magazine, "Who Will Be the Slovene Morina?", are quite to the point. Most of them, in fact, are people who were trained for long years primarily in party, military, and internal security schools, and have also used their knowledge of that kind in political work. The common characteristic of the methods that emerge from such schools is strict conspiracy, a division of people into friends and enemies, hidden personnel maneuvers, the law as a means of settling scores with people who think differently, etc.

Ivan Macek Matija, Major General in Peacetime, National Hero

He was born on 28 May 1908 in Zadobrova, near Ljubljana, in a working-class family. After finishing elementary school he studied to be a carpenter, although he engaged in his profession for only a short time, since he devoted himself to party work. He held all the posts from secretary of a party cell to secretary of the Communist Party's provincial committee for Slovenia.

After the war he was vice president of the government of the Slovene People's Republic, a member of the LCY Central Committee and the Slovene LC Central Committee, etc. As a prewar communist, he was absolutely the closest colleague and friend of Josip Broz Tito. In the 1950's Tito gave him a Rolls Royce, along with other Slovene political dignitaries. Recently his influence has declined because of age and illness, but it is still great.

Sergej Kraigher, Reserve Lieutenant Colonel in Peacetime

He was born in 1914 in Postojna. Before the war he was a medical student. He held less significant posts during the NOB [National Liberation Struggle], and also after the war up until the death of his cousin, Boris Kraigher. Then he was president of the Slovene Assembly, president of the presidencies of Slovenia and Yugoslavia, vice president of the FEC, and a member of the Slovene LC Central Committee and the LCY Central Committee. From 1968 on he was slowly taking over Kardelj's role as regent in the area of ideology, after Kardelj's death he took it over, and to date he has preserved considerable influence upon the preparation of various conceptual documents in all areas, from the political system to the economy and social policy.

Sergej Kraigher's Interest Group

Stane Dolanc (Vice President of the SFRY Presidency), Stefan Korosec (Secretary of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee), Marjan Orozen (President of the Council of the Yugoslav Federation of Trade Unions), Andrej Marinc (the Slovene Presidency), Miran Potrc (president of the Slovene Assembly), Vlado Klemencic (Presidium of the Slovene LC Central Committee), Zdravko Krvina (republic Territorial Defense staff), Vinko Hafner (LCY Central Committee), etc.

Spheres of Influence of Sergej Kraigher's Interest Group

The Trbovlje basin, the electrical industry, the Celje region, the city of Maribor, the State Security Service, part of the KOS, historiography, part of the republic administration, the judicial system, the trade unions, etc.

Ivan Macek's Interest Group

Janez Zemljarič (former vice president of the FEC), Joze Smole (president of the republic conference of the SZDL [Socialist Alliance of Working People], Iztok Winkler (the Ljubljana LCY City Committee), Nusa Kersevan (the Ljubljana mayor), France Popit (retired, Council of the Republic), Olga Vipotnik (retired, Council of the Republic), Janko Kusar (Republic Secretary for National Defense), Pepca Kardelj (retired, Council of the Republic), Bojan Polak (president of the ZZB NOV of Slovenia), Lojze Briski (member of the Slovene Presidency), Marjan Lenarčič (ZZB NOV of Slovenia), Vlado Janžič (Ljubljana Radio-Television), etc.

Spheres of Influence of the Interest Group of Ivan Macek

The city of Ljubljana, banks, Smelt, Slovenia Highways, part of the State Security Service, the Kočevje "military district," foreign affairs, part of the republic administration, the republic budget, the Chamber, the pioneer organization, the Emigrant House, etc.

The joint operational base still consists of: Miha Ravnik (president of the Council of the Federation of Trade Unions of Slovenia), Stane Markič (president of the Slovene Constitutional Court), Zoran Polić (presidency of the republic conference of the SZDL), Marjan Rozic (Tourist Federation of Slovenia), Tomaz Ertl (Slovene Secretary for Internal Affairs), Janez Zajc (Slovene Secretary for Justice and Administration), Dusan Sinigoj (President of the Slovene Executive Council), Igor Ursis (Central Committee of the Slovene LC), Tina Tomlje (presidium of the Slovene LC), etc.

Montenegrin Leader Bulatovic Reflects on Current Issues

28000116 Belgrade *POLITIKA EKSPRES* in Serbo-Croatian 23 Apr 89 p 12

[Article by Momir Bulatovic, chairman of the Committee for Preparation of the Extraordinary Congress of the Montenegrin League of Communists, prepared along with other material by Budo Simonovic: "I Did What Grandma Janica Said"; first four paragraphs are *POLITIKA EKSPRES* introduction]

[Text] The day before the joint meeting last autumn of the Presidium of the Montenegrin LC Central Committee and the Presidium of the University Conference of the League of Communists of "Veljko Vlahovic" University in Titograd, which without exaggeration can be called historic, more accurately, at noon on 9 December in the home of Savo Bulatovic, retired lieutenant colonel of the YPA, a small family council was in session. Savo's younger son Momir, an instructor in the School of Economics of Titograd University, who at that time was secretary of the Presidium of the University Conference of the LC, had brought together his mother, his father, and his grandmother Janica to read them the speech

which he intended to deliver the next day under the vault of the Sociopolitical Chamber on the bank of the Moraca.

When he finished, Grandma Janica was the first to speak up. A proud and robust woman of 87, belonging to the Piperi tribe, was evidently excited by her grandson's words, embraced him and briefly said: "That's just the way, son." He was also supported by his mother and father, but what was important to him was what his Grandma Janica would say, what the wise old woman would say who had felt the burden of so many years on her back and had experienced so many wars and so many times of peace.

All the Yugoslav media reported the next day that Momir Bulatovic had thrown up into the face of the entire executive body of the Montenegrin party, along with other bitter and thunderous truths, the following words: "The demand for democratization of society is a demand that we take our destiny into our own hands. We have enough will, strength, and knowledge to make a beginning, the only other thing we need is for you to leave the political scene."

Just a month later, Momir Bulatovic's words were to come true, and it was his honor in the name of the organizing committee to announce from the steps of the Assembly building on the bank of the Ribnica to a crowd of about 150,000 people that the bureaucracy was on its knees. This young man, who had so suddenly charmed all men of goodwill, not only in this republic, but all those who strive for changes and progress, was then entrusted the responsibility of heading the committee to prepare the 10th Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Montenegro. The preparations have been completed, the representatives of Montenegrin Communists will be gathering in Titograd the day after tomorrow. It is on that occasion that Momir Bulatovic speaks today to readers of *POLITIKA EKSPRES*.

The congress could begin today. All the preparations have been completed, and it seems to me that they have been extremely well done. According to official assessments of the Central Committee, so many people took part in the pre-congress discussion that this activity can rightly be referred to as one of the most massive political actions in the history of Montenegro.

Everything was done, as is well known, in great speed and therefore, in spite of numerous compliments, we need to be realistic and recall the folksaying "Whatever has been done quickly, has also been incomplete." We should also recall in this connection that the decision on the date for holding the extraordinary congress was made by the Montenegrin LC Central Committee in its old membership which has been politically discredited. That is why the setting of such a short date could also be interpreted as a kind of political obstruction. But at the same time, a great service has been done thereby to the

entire membership of the Central Committee in this republic, which has been motivated to perform extremely numerous activities in an unusually short period of time.

I think that the committee for preparation of the congress has done its job extremely well in the framework of a body hastily gotten together whose main characteristics were youth and political inexperience, but also an exceptional technical expertise in various fields. That is why it was not important who was chairman and who was an ordinary member. In any case, I sincerely hope that I have justified the secret vote that gave me confidence and that I have contributed to work of the committee to the extent that was expected of an individual responsible for coordinating all the activities in the committee.

As for the proposed documents of the congress, our point of departure was the truth recognized by the people that one specific move is worth more than a ton of nicely written resolutions. At one place in those documents, we described the bureaucratic system, not only in Montenegro, but also in Yugoslavia, as a time of appearance and as a time of oversight. Previously, it was arranged for us so that we could change things with the paper perfection of numerous documents, resolutions, and conclusions. At the same time, we overlooked that life was following certain currents of its own and that the real problems had a great many connections to a socialist reality and reality of self-management that had been nicely pictured.

A Truthful Waking Up

Yet we are aware that all the events in Montenegro and Yugoslavia, which will be the topic taken up by our extraordinary congress, cannot fit on some 60 pages, which is the number that the congress documents we have written comes to. We have therefore tried for what is written in ourselves to contain some driving force, for this to be a truth that will awaken us from our passivity up to now and will set us in motion so that we ourselves take our destiny in our own hands.

In the discussion so far concerning the proposed congress documents, two points of criticism have been most frequent: that we did not appropriately emphasize Tito's name and work and that we did not pay due attention to the dangers of nationalism. Assuming that there is no need to constantly and repeatedly pledge allegiance to all the values of a self-managed society, we felt there was no need to count how many times we mentioned Tito and Tito's deeds. We simply felt, for all the real historical dimension which Tito has and which every politician must have, that even every mention of Yugoslavia, of brotherhood and unity, of self-management, and of the other achievements of the revolution essentially signified a mention of Tito.

Yet so that we would eliminate any possible misunderstandings, Tito's name is there in the proposed documents of the congress. Now, we are just a bit afraid how to answer

the possible objections that his name is mentioned only once, and not many times more.

Yet with respect to nationalism, we quite deliberately omitted it from the congress documents, since everyone who worked on their preparation and the immense majority of those who have debated them felt, by contrast with the previous political team, that nationalism is not the cause, but only one of the tragic consequences of all the problems we have been living through in Yugoslavia. By affirming the unified Yugoslav market, we are actually trying to point to the mechanism by which it will be evident to all of us that we all, while we are working, are citizens of Yugoslavia, of Europe, and of the world. Nationalism is an expression of primitivism, and we are looking to the future.

In any case, at this point it is very difficult to be smart and to evaluate how much benefit has been achieved and how much damage done by the commitment to which we were inclined in January at the moment when the entire system was called into question in Montenegro. I personally think that the failure to dissolve the Central Committee was a good political move. During this period, the Central Committee has not had much to do, to be sure, but still its Presidium, made up entirely of new people and new members of the Central Committee, handled an immense amount of daily political business and made it possible for the committee to prepare the congress under relatively stable conditions.

As for the Montenegrin Assembly and other sociopolitical forums, in spite of a number of successful activities, they have also committed a fair number of breaches. The benefit from this has been the increasingly evident belief that ultimate victory and achievement of the will of the people do not come about all at once, but have to be the consequence of a lengthy and well-thought-out activity.

Judging by the way things have gone up to now, I do not expect that there will be great resistance in the congress to the necessary changes which have been demanded for so long in politics and the economy. But we should not be deceived. The old politics has actually gone underground, and that type of activity can be very dangerous.

In any case, when I speak about the problems of changes in personnel, I am thinking of young people in particular. The appearance has somehow been created that they are here, probably because all of this is looked at through a few young people who have been the most exposed in these events. I think that it would be better to say that the young people have yet to come, but that in the present state of things they are on the best road for achieving this. Even here, of course, youth is not measured in years, but in the degree of will and determination to have an effect on one's own destiny and the entire destiny of society.

Incidentally, many of the demands that have been expressed since last fall were written by young people. For example, the demand came from the university for deprofessionalization of political office. This demand

enjoyed exceptional support and thus became a general demand of the working people and citizens of Montenegro. Its realism is a matter of the time in which we live. It should be emphasized, however, that at this moment a large number of positions in Montenegro are held by officeholders who are not professionals. It is understandable, of course, that that kind of enthusiasm cannot last for a long time, but it is also to be expected that the number of political executive offices will be cut in half at least during the coming period.

As one of the originators of that idea, I personally felt a high responsibility to insist on its being implemented. Nevertheless, should I be elected to some political office which will require working an 8-hour day, I probably will have no other choice than to hold on to my present salary as an instructor in the School of Economics. This is one of the sacrifices which the individual must make if he wants to prove that the idea is much more important than its proponent.

The Fear of the Unemployment Office

This way that I see things has also motivated me to demand that the leaders who have been removed go to the unemployment office. I think that this is altogether normal and justified. Unfortunately, the mention of the unemployment office arouses fear, but that is a fear that has been experienced for years first by those 46,000 people unemployed in this republic, and then by the immense number of those who are their relatives and friends. In some happy time, the unemployment office should be a mandatory way station for all those who are required to show and prove their ability to perform particular jobs. If, then, the politicians who have been removed are to go back to their professional field (assuming they have one), I see no radicalism at all in the demand that they obtain employment by lawful means.

Bringing a politician from some political heaven of theirs onto the solid ground of everyday life, which in essence is abolishing all types of privileges, also has a more profound meaning: so much necessary political trust required by the revolutionary transformation of society cannot be gained from a special-purpose villa nor from looking at the beauties of our homeland from a helicopter.

This Is Not an Escapade

New people are also necessary, of course, for new ideas, new demands, and new exertions. It remains to be seen whether we will get them from the election model to which we committed ourselves in advance of the extraordinary congress the day after tomorrow. In spite of significant improvements, which are evident, that election model also has certain shortcomings, but it was accepted by the membership mostly because it insists on direct elections.

In conclusion, I must also say this: I am convinced that all of this is not some kind of "intellectual escapade," as one of the members of the Montenegrin LC Central Committee referred to it in a recent meeting. After all, this is neither the time nor the moment for intellectual gymnastics. But I think that in spite of the disagreement with certain assertions, we have to constantly confront these opposition opinions and objections. Otherwise, in the absence of an open dialogue, an individual or group can very easily convince himself that he is the most intelligent and chosen by God to reveal all the truths of this world. That is the essential advantage of democratic dialogue that we are working for politically and whose correctness and indispensability we believe in profoundly.

[Box p 12]

The Price of the Wrong Policy

"We have to admit that in Kosovo the political battle has been lost for the moment, but since Kosovo is an integral and inseparable part of Yugoslavia, it is understandable that the state should undertake all the necessary measures, although they are painful and undemocratic," Momir Bulatovic said. "By setting up a state based on law and getting it on its feet, the conditions necessarily have to be brought about in Kosovo for the beginning and success of true political activity, without which there is no lasting solution to the Kosovo drama. It is tragic that young people have lost their lives in Kosovo who were not to blame for that entire set of problems, but it is equally tragic that numerous quasi-democrats in Yugoslavia do not realize that this is the price of a policy that was mistaken for many years, the price which in spite of all humane principles must be paid in the interest of a firm, indivisible, and stable Yugoslavia."

Deception of the Bureaucracy

"When millions of people come together in one place unanimously demanding achievement of what should have been our reality long ago, and when those same people do not show hatred toward anyone except the bureaucracy, then the story about some threat to brotherhood and unity is just another of the numerous deceptions of the bureaucracy which feels that its hour of judgment has come," Momir Bulatovic said. "One of the most explosive weapons in its abundant arsenal is to wrap itself in the ethnic cloak. By concealing its own stupidity and inability, it has invented imaginary ethnogenetic characteristics of the nationality or ethnic minority which it represents and which, be it said in passing, they were never elected nor authorized to represent."

Fabrications About the 'Imported Revolution'

"The linked destinies of the Yugoslav nationalities, especially of the Serbian and Montenegrin nationalities, and the sincere sympathies which Slobodan Milosevic, as a politician of a new stamp, has been winning in Montenegro, cannot be a sufficient reason to speak about an alleged 'imported revolution' in this republic,"

Momir Bulatovic said. "Immediately after January, various passions flared up like those of soccer fans, the fan cannot objectively judge things and his convictions, however reasonable they may be, are of practically no benefit. That is why we decided to think through the processes that had been initiated and to carry them out to the greatest possible degree, showing thereby that Montenegro is an inseparable part of Yugoslavia, but also an independent and very proud republic. All those who still cannot accept or will not accept that fact, talking about some alleged threat to Montenegro, are actually talking about their own hopelessness, lack of understanding, and weakness."

[Box p 12]

All of Momir's Straight A's

An outstanding activist in the republic and federal conferences of the Socialist Youth League, Momir Bulatovic was the best student in Montenegro 10 years ago. He completed his postgraduate study with a straight A, and as a young scientist he was recently awarded a prize from the "Petar Vuckevic" Fund, which is awarded to young people for exceptional scientific results. Bulatovic is a political economist, and his narrow specialized field is excess income and income from property. The title of the doctoral dissertation which he is preparing is "Economic Equality in a Self-Managed Economy." Bulatovic also engages in journalism. For all of 13 years he has been a staff member of the university paper UNIVERZITETSKA RIJEC.

The Yugoslav

Savo Bulatovic and his wife Sofija met by accident in the fifties—in Kosovo. He was a Montenegrin from Kuc, a young officer, while she was a Hercegovinian woman from near Ljubinje who had happened to come to visit relatives in Kosovo. Their younger son Momir was born in 1956 in Belgrade. He finished elementary and secondary school in Zadar, and the School of Economics and postgraduate work in Titograd. He finished the reserve commissioned officer school in Sarajevo. His wife Nada, who has a law degree, works in the self-managed community of interest for education, and Momir's greatest joy are certainly his 4-year-old daughter Nina and 2-year-old son Bosko.

Full Range of 'Conspiracy' Theories Explored
28000112 Belgrade MLADOST in Serbo-Croatian
10 Apr 89 pp 12-13

[Article by Aleksandar Boskovic: "From Conspiracy to Conspiracy"; first paragraph is MLADOST introduction]

[Text] In accordance with experience the world over, rather than acknowledge the law and superior merit,

almost all parts of Yugoslavia have acknowledged a conspiracy against themselves. The conspirators do not acknowledge anything.

The frequent observation of facts that are not easy to accept or explain and of evil and injustice done to the very ones who are the model of integrity and goodness has long caused people to try to rationalize events. Any such rationalization (in the sense of a simplified explanation) necessarily takes the form most acceptable to the greatest number of people (like-minded people, of course)—but educated people, scientists, artists have often rejected these rationalizations. But there is also the rationalization which uses the so-called conspiracy against the nation, state, culture, etc. to explain existing conditions or correlations of forces. Such a conspiracy has to explain obvious injustices being done by others to the threatened persons against a broader background: as part of a conspiracy in which various sinister forces join together for the purpose of threatening the nation, state, or culture.

Such explanations are very popular because they uncover at a single stroke, as it were, various "sinister games" which, once uncovered, reveal to the light of day the entire complex of forces united with but a single goal: to contribute to the conspiracy.

Not Invented Here

Today this theory is being used to explain the influx of Japanese capital into the United States (Japanese conspiracy). What is usually forgotten in this case is the fact that Japan is still number 3 in terms of investment in the United States (after Great Britain and the Netherlands), along with the problems that the Japanese economy itself faces as a result of its large surpluses and its own structure. But the very fact that in this context we still hear nothing about a "British" or "Netherlands" conspiracy suggests that the advocates of this theory are not entirely free of racist motives.

In the 1950's the "Communist conspiracy" was popular in the United States, while there was the "imperialist conspiracy" in the USSR in the era of Joseph Vissarionovich. We can place the origins of the latter in the period right after the October Revolution, when the difficulties of setting up the new government and the violent elimination of the other left parties were justified by the "theory of encirclement"—but Leon Trotsky was nonetheless obliged to abandon his goal of inciting revolution. In any case, of all the conspiracies known to us to date, this conspiracy is probably the one that has cost the most lives (figures range from 20 to 30 million).

Since the rise to power of the Imam Khomeini (1979) and all the Islamic fundamentalist organizations, the Islamic conspiracy theory has been very popular as well. According to this theory, even the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is seen as part of the superpower agreements to prevent the "Islamicization" of this very important

country. In addition, adherents of this theory point to the growing number of Muslims in the Soviet armed forces, to their high birth rate, etc. (One leg of this theory pertains to our country as well, but we will return to that later.) It is indicative that the supporters of this theory are largely to be found in Europe and America, whereas it does not have any supporters in Asia (where the largest number of Muslims live).

There is also a counterthesis, the Christian conspiracy theory. According to the adherents of this theory (mainly Arabs), the great powers somehow "divided up the world" in the 19th century and this division still holds even today in many respects. One of the consequences of this division is that it is necessary at all costs to prevent the Arab countries' cultural and political unification, and to this end aid is given to Israel, the most important destabilizing factor in the region.

In Yugoslavia such rationalizations have long been fashionable. We only need to remember the instructions issued to German troops in 1941; these pointed out that the Serbs, along with all their fine traits, were very susceptible to rumors, that these could be destructive, and that the German troops should rely on the Serbs. Although this specific case involved one nation, similar statements could also be made about the others in our region with a clean conscience.

A few years ago Academician Josip Vidmar argued in print that since the war the Slovenes have been exploited economically by the other federal units. This "anti-Slovene conspiracy" had great influence in helping to shape a portion of Slovene public opinion which is playing a significant role in current debates and polemics. It is particularly interesting in this case that various economists from Slovenia and Serbia have "crossed swords" in the polemics, with each side proving (selecting data to support its own view) that its own nation has been exploited—and that the other side always came out better.

Our Affairs

But economists cannot get along without politicians (and vice versa) and the media (mainly the mass media in Belgrade) have raised the thesis of an anti-Serbian conspiracy.

Since this is the most popular "conspiracy," I will devote the most space to it. One of the basic elements is the so-called Albanian conspiracy, which is connected with the aforementioned Islamic conspiracy. This is based on the traditional clash of Islam and Christianity in the Balkans and to a lesser degree on the so-called Muslim question. (Although we can agree that "Muslim" is a rather clumsy choice of name for the nation, I must point out that in this "question" the problem lies in the lack of acquaintance with elementary historical factors, with the mutual influence of the various faiths on the territory of what is today Bosnia-Herzegovina, and with the fact that

the population of these areas has long been known as "Bosnians." Why "Muslims" rather than "Bosnians" is quite a different question, but it is interesting that both the Serbs and the Croats have agreed wholeheartedly on the former term.)

The Albanian conspiracy comes up in the context of plans to create a "Greater Albania" including parts of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, along with Kosovo and Albania. This particular conspiracy is linked with the activities of several groups of Albanian separatists committed to the plan of creating an ethnically pure Kosovo (given the percentage of the remaining Slavic population, this plan has virtually been accomplished). However, this ignores the differences among the Albanians themselves, especially the middle and upper strata, some of whom are for a "Kosovo Republic" in the conviction that they will be better off if that comes about (i.e. they will get more money, they will control directly the mineral economy of that very rich area, etc.). Most recently the Albanian conspiracy has come to include any position that differs from the positions "adopted and agreed on" in Serbia, regardless of what is at issue. The first time this was formulated at an official forum as part of the anti-Serbian conspiracy was last September at the joint session of the Serbian Presidency and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, where one of the participants referred to the Pristina-Zagreb-*Novi Sad* axis.

What is interesting here is the inclusion of Zagreb (the Slovenes still were not in the news, while *Novi Sad* was more of a warning to "autonomists" who still had not "gotten off the ground") as an indicator of traditional "Croatian hatred for the Serbs and everything that is Serbian."

'Serbs in the Air'

This is a theory formulated to some extent in a work published in KNJIZEVNA NOVINA by Prof Krestic on the "roots" of the Ustasha crimes in the NDH [Independent State of Croatia]. Although this is indisputably a very interesting text, it looks at the roots in a rather one-sided fashion (there are no facts about Serbs' privileges in Austria-Hungary or on their role in putting down demonstrations and riots, etc.). This part of the conspiracy depends on ignoring the fact that the Serbian nation suffered the most casualties in both world wars and ignoring—until recently—vital parts of Serbian history (above all World War I). The attempts to make hay from the dead at Jasenovac are also irritating (by the way, it is equally insulting to estimate the victims at "40,000" and at "several million"), whereby Prof Boban shows himself in a rather bad light as well.

Croatian "Serbophobia" is intertwined to some extent with the Comintern conspiracy, the goal of which allegedly is to influence the Communists of Serbia and the rest of Yugoslavia so as to put Serbia permanently into a subordinate position. Although it is difficult to believe

that the world organization of Communist parties devotes all its power and its tremendous potential only to this problem, this is the most popular aspect of the anti-Serbian conspiracy and Tito and Kardelj also get brought into it. In a broader sense (when we get involved with "Croatian hatred"), we also have the Vatican, the Ustasha, and Stipe Suvar, not to mention the Slovene leadership. This is also very closely linked with the "unprincipled coalition," a concept which is very popular in Serbia (it sounds nicer than "conspiracy" and it does not mention Tito and Kardelj) and whose creators have not yet explained it. Besides, logically it is nonsense since every coalition is unprincipled, otherwise it would not be a coalition. Also interesting is the alternating way Tito and Kardelj are "brought into play"; they are unofficially said to be guilty and then they are officially defended ("attacks on their name and person") and then back to the attack again, by asking who is responsible for the 1974 Constitution (it is hard to introduce a Constitution without the consent of the chief of state), and so on, back and forth.

Since the (Serbian) nation has come to the fore in Serbia, the protagonists of this conspiracy are also plotting against the nation in its glorious campaign of the "anti-bureaucratic revolution." Miroslav Solevic has said much (too much) about this revolution and there are two opposite assertions about the scope of it. One comes from Radmila Andjelkovic (Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia): "History teaches us that the nation is always right." The second is from German Nobel Prize winner Heinrich Boll: "Unfortunately, history shows that the nation is not always right." Depending on which of these two assertions you lean toward, you will be for or against the whole theory.

There is also the Serbian conspiracy, the goal of which is to set up an "ethnic government" (i.e. to include all the Serbs in Yugoslavia under a single government), which is based on the unceasing injustices done to this nation in Yugoslavia. It is embodied in a map of the "Kingdom of Tsar Dushan" published in PRAKTICNA ZENA—

which is astonishingly similar to the plan for the solution of the Serbian question displayed in January 1944 at the Chetnik congress in the village of Bo.

'Kusturic Syndrome'

Finally, there is also the individual conspiracy, the conspiracy against certain individuals. These are generally famous and admired persons (politicians, artists), and others want to do them ill out of pure malice and because of their own petty interests. I would call this type of conspiracy the "Kusturic Syndrome" in honor of our famous director, who "broke off communications" with his native country when he moved to the United States, as a mark of protest at somebody's daring to advance a critical assessment of his work. He was also upset at the fact that not exactly everybody agreed with his eulogies of some politicians ("now all the nation is asking...") and he compared himself in his open letter with the great personalities of our culture like Ivo Andric, Mesa Selimovic, etc.

Here we must also note the "case" of Zagreb theater director Slobodan Snajder, who declared his premises off limits to the youth newspaper GORDOGAN because its editor dared to write something critical about his opus in another newspaper. In addition, Snajder is in the dumps because some people have told him that anybody named Snajder cannot be a Croat and because Paolo Madeli (also a director) is doing all sorts of things.

In Belgrade a few weeks ago the Koca Popovic conspiracy was making news. He dared to propose integrating the Albanians into Yugoslavia as a way to resolve the Kosovo crisis. Naturally he was immediately attacked by the mouthpieces of the anti-Serbian conspiracy theory, perhaps in part because his statements did not offer any material to support the Comintern conspiracy thesis. But since he studied in France (Sorbonne) and France is part of the West (and Zoran Todorovic says that "all evils have always come to us from the West") and there are the Alps/Adriatic... perhaps a new conspiracy is on the horizon.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Greater Demands Placed on Air Defense Forces
*23000171 East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in
German No 3, 1989 pp 114-116*

[Article by Maj Gen G. Hiemann: "Command and Control Units of the Air/Air Defense Force on the Road to Intensification and Rationalization"]

[Text] The demands made of troop command and control are constantly increasing. Efforts aimed at its improvement are taking place in close cooperation with the Soviet Army and the other allied armies. In keeping with the concrete demands made of our branch of service, the command and control organs of the air/air defense force are striving to grasp new developments in troop command and control and put them into practice, as well as at the same time to uncover and eliminate any obstacles that might arise.

Troop command and control in the National People's Army is governed by the principles of military doctrine of the GDR. The main criterion for the quality and effectiveness of troop command and control in peacetime is the capability to efficiently teach ground, air and naval forces what they need to repel an act of aggression which is still possible today, how to maintain constant combat and mobilization readiness, and in the process utilize all resources economically and time intensively.

1. Multiplicity of Tasks of Command and Control Units

The command and control system of the air/air defense forces of the National People's Army of the GDR, consisting of the command and control organs, specially organized command and control units, the communications and air traffic control system, and the automated command and control system, possesses a high level of organization and combat readiness.

In the unified air defense system, the crews of the command and control units used in the air defense continuous duty alert system bear a great responsibility for total observation of the airspace. Mistakes, distortions or delays are not allowed in the conduct of the continuous duty alert system.

An important facet in the activity of the crews of the command and control units consists of procuring, collecting and analyzing situation information and relaying this on a timely basis to commanders and command and control organs for a valid estimate of the situation. This task must be performed without a break, in the shortest possible time, and with a minimum of resources.

A significant criterion for the quality of the activity of crews on duty at the command and control centers is their ability to assess the developing situation with foresightedness and circumspection, and to recommend courses of action consistent with the targets and objectives existing at the time.

The crews on duty work in accordance with tried and tested technological principles of combat duty. They have a special duty organization, and they engage in extensive vertical and horizontal information links which enable them to accomplish their assigned tasks at all times.

Personnelwise, materially and technically, the uninterrupted work at the command and control units is very costly.

Army personnel and civilian employees of the command and control units, [and] in the forefront the communist party members, therefore view it as their primary duty to make economic use of the resources at their disposal, as well as to intensify and streamline all aspects of combat duty and the engineering-technical maintenance of the protective structures.

2. Creative Thinking Is Expected at All Times

An analysis of the 7th Congress of the Central Committee of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany-GDR] has given our work new impulses. Today, the commanders of the command and control units, the party organizations, the crews on duty, and the repair and maintenance units perceive five main directions for the intensification and rationalization of command and control and maintenance units in the command and control centers of the air/air defense force.

2.1. Rational Utilization of the Work Capability

In large measure, the use of automated information systems is being expanded and the existing automation complexes are being improved. This opens up new possibilities for a better organized and faster information flow for the transmission of real-time situation data.

The determination of the absolutely essential personnel resources required for this is one of the points of departure for further intensification and streamlining.

A pivotal task consists of making available, from the army members assigned to shift duty, the troops required for the maintenance and repair of the new command and control technology. This road cannot be traveled without some hardship. The duty routine to which one has grown accustomed through the years is given up only reluctantly. Reserves in the work capability during combat duty, especially in information processing, are difficult to determine. Their utilization is rejected by many for the reason that a specific duty post must be manned continuously.

Based on our experiences, a reduction can be successfully carried out if the commander analyzes the situation together with his team, new technological solutions are worked out, and members of the technical services of the command and control organ get involved and participate. During the past 2 years, it was possible, for example, in combat sectors and groups of command and control units, to remove 20 to 40 percent of the army personnel from the continuous shift duty and utilize them for other tasks in the command and control units. It was possible, in several cases, to decrease the total number of personnel.

2.2. Control the Information Flow

Periodically, we analyze the extensive information activity of command and control units and organs. We do this on the basis of current and future requirements of situation assessment and timely decisionmaking for the command and control of the troops and resources on duty, for maintaining combat readiness, and carrying out combat training. One of the basic requirements is a reduction in the amount of information required from the organizations and units, and in this way streamlining the information system.

The demand for intensification and rationalization is often countered with the argument that the existing information system can be made effective only with additional technical equipment. Most of the time, the role and the position of the human being in the command and control system are overlooked in the process. With the experiences and skills gained by him, he has developed stable customs and technologies in communicating, refined them, and applies them appropriately, confidently and rapidly in the various situations. Many times it is inexpedient and also uneconomical to use a computer or other technology in his place.

For a number of years, there has been a demand that the volume of information be reduced (immediate messages, reports, statistics, documents, report forms, evaluation sheets, analyses, etc.). Neither a large computer nor an individual at the workplace can accomplish this, however. In the human being-technology relationship, it is the human being who produces the information jungle, and only the human being can eliminate it.

Our experiences indicate that a rationalization of information activity presupposes our determination to systematically subordinate information requirements to decisionmaking requirements and authority of the command and control level concerned.

With a great commitment, unit N. has taken a new road in working on the direction in which the continuous duty alert system of air defense is to go, and it has effectively exploited the many technical possibilities. The information possibilities increased many times over.

After this became known in the command and control organs and units, the information requirements increased insidiously. This did not take place without consequences for the troops. New data was "justified" with improved decision preparation, an increased reaction capability, or the new capacities, which could be employed with "little" effort. The point was then reached where the exploitation of the technical possibilities led to a subjective inflation of the need for information and would soon have required a greater number of personnel for the acquisition of data.

A great effort was required to counter a development such as this and to reverse it through aggressive actions. Helping us here were the findings of our party, according to which, "for air defense of the homeland, as well, extensive intensification...has become imperative"¹ and represents "a political task of far-reaching importance."² They became the guide for our actions.

2.3. Improve Duty Conditions

The nature of the information processing in the command and control units is such that it has a perceptible effect on factors influencing performance and impairing health, including psychological fatigue, monotony, psychological satiation, and psychological stress, among others, and thus on the duty, working and living conditions of the personnel assigned to the command and control units. Reducing the negative impact of the factors cited is one of the objectives of rationalization.

Great demands are made of the psychophysical performance capability of the crews at the command and control units. In the fore are questions of psychoemotional stability, motivation, effectiveness of action, short-term memory, the ability to observe and react, planning, foresight, anticipatory attitude, operational reliability, and conscious discipline.³

The action processes at various duty positions in a command and control unit were examined. For the officers, for example, this yielded between 69 and 217 actions in 70 minutes (seven measurements of 10 minutes each, taken over a 21-hour period). Observed in the process were a high acoustical and optical information density, the forced distribution of a state of permanent alertness, and pressure of time. The average breakdown by individual types of information: 58.7 percent involved acoustical information, 24.6 percent were activities involving writing and reading, and 16.7 percent involved the optical reception of information.

Since these measurements were taken, we have significantly changed the manner in which certain information groups are taken, as well as the proportions between the various types of information, which we are modifying in favor of optical information.

In unit D., the following was determined: After decreasing the acoustical information and extending the possibilities for the optical reception of information, there was not only a change in the action processes themselves, but they became calmer and more positive at the same time, less hectic activity and pressure of time were evident.

In a real situation, the expected effect did in fact take place. Certain parameters of the duty conditions improved.

2.4. Preparation of New Solution by All

New technical solutions required in the command and control units provide the impetus for new technologies used in combat duty.

Teams of the command and control units developed new information technology equipment, with the help of which partial situations can be automatically transmitted and displayed. This equipment was introduced in considerable numbers in the combat duty of the air/air defense force. Its technical design is consistent with modern-day requirements. It is based on microelectronic components of the GDR.

The employment of this equipment made it necessary to change several of the processes used in the past in the transmission and display of the situation, to proceed differently in the continuing assessment of the situation, and to heighten the accuracy requirements of several subprocesses of situation acquisition and processing. Here difficulties were encountered, because we had failed to prepare the human being for the introduction of the technological changes with the same persistence and precision that marked the introduction of the equipment itself.

In situations such as this, it comes as no surprise that both the proponents of the new and the defenders of the old put in their appearance. Many a member of the command and control units, when reading this, will be reminded with an amused smile of where he stood on the issue. Today this is past history. What remains for us is the awareness that, for all the technical solutions introduced subsequently as well as in the future, special attention must be given to technological integration into the combat duty and to giving the crews of the command and control units an insight into the design philosophy inherent in the technology.

It should be noted that, with the equipment mentioned above, not only did an operational improvement in troop command and control take place, but there was also a demonstrable saving in the socially oriented work capacity at the command and control units.

2.5. Make Reserves Accessible

The continually growing microelectronic basis of command and control and information technology as well as automatic control equipment has an impact on the engineering-technical conditions in the operation of power generating, air-technical and support equipment.

In unit W., the youth innovation team B. and the innovation team P. have developed low-maintenance measurement and control facilities which are intended for use with noncommercial and water-driven power equipment and which work on the basis of microelectronic components. Because of lower materiel costs for spare parts and the energy saved, this resulted in an annual saving of approximately 7000 marks in one command and control unit alone. At the same time, the cost of maintenance decreased.

Both teams are currently working on a complex solution of the computer-supported central monitoring of operating states. They are trying to better adapt the operating mode of the individual pieces of equipment to the actual status and the requirements of the command and control unit as a whole, and in this way save electrical energy and other materials.

An extensive field of activity for intensification and rationalization in the command and control units is based on the simultaneous use of control and information systems of different generations and modifications at one and the same command and control unit. The substitution of components and the development of the most varied types of peripheral equipment increase the application spectrum of available technical equipment, lower the consumption of spare parts, increase the normative service life of the technology, and lower the operating costs of the command and control technology.

In unit O., a small team has managed, through outstanding maintenance and repair, to exceed the normative service life (15 years) of a technical system by (thus far) 5 years while at the same time fulfilling the required performance parameters without a break. Decommissioned components taken from the systems of other users were repaired and the prerequisites for operations until 1995 thus created. The list of spare parts having to be imported decreased in size significantly.

In addition, the team made intelligent use of components of a different type of system and improved the performance of their own system while at the same time lowering the amount of energy consumed. This resulted in a saving of approximately 350,000 marks.

3. Maintain a State of Constant Alertness

The advances registered in years past in the introduction and development of means for the automation of troop command and control also led to a further concentration of information, however, so that the command and

control units of the air/air defense force are of constant intelligence interest to other countries. At the same time, one thing cannot be overlooked: The activity of the intelligence services of the capitalist countries is marked by an ever broader symbiosis of espionage and scientific-technical progress. The latest achievements in the area of modern cosmic and electronic technology are exploited by them.⁴

It is therefore indispensable, in innovation work, in research and development, as well as in technological modifications to the information system, to correctly assess the extensive possibilities of intelligence surveillance from the outset, and to enforce the pertinent military directives resolutely.

4. Intelligently Preserve and Expand Achievements Made to Date

A solid technical basis for the self-contained, multistage automated command and control system of the air/air defense force has been created and is constantly being improved. From the outset, personnel assigned to the command and control units have done everything possible to master this system both technologically and technically.

For many years the prescribed operational coefficients have been achieved. Again and again, the idea of teaming up young specialized cadre members with experienced practitioners has proved its worth. In the process, they demonstrated extraordinary commitment, the thought processes of an engineer, responsibility in dealing with resources, diligence and discipline in their daily work, as well as exactness, orderliness and assuredness in the technological processes.

Thanks to purposeful political and military leadership, productive innovation teams have emerged in many places. Specialized personnel of the various services look after them conscientiously and very attentively follow the first hesitant steps of the innovators. In this way, it has been possible, again and again, to gain additional specialized cadre members and integrate them into the research work.

The technical operational preparation, in the military-scientific accompaniment of new technical systems, and in the training of leaders for the exploitation of modern information technology, provided varied experience.

The phenomenon observed in the early 1980's, to become awestruck at the mere sight of automation equipment, or to look for the cause of deficiencies in estimating the situation first of all in the automated command and control technology, has been overcome. Contributing to this were the computer science training increasingly conducted since 1986, the broad application of computer-supported simulators in combat training, the extensive integration of computer technology into the training of student officers at the training facilities of

the air/air defense force, as well as the computer club of the FDJ [Free German Youth]. A close cooperation with scientific facilities and economic combines has developed.

5. Concluding Remarks

From the aforementioned main directions for the intensification and rationalization of command and control and maintenance processes in the command and control units of the air/air defense force, the breadth of the military-scientific and military-technical work becomes evident. And yet, more and more, it has become possible to perform this work in the required timeframe as well.

Possible reserves for further intensification and rationalization are seen by us particularly in activities having a long-term orientation.

Our experiences indicate that success is bound to come in those situations where the operational officers and the technical services officers and technical specialists jointly penetrate into the operational content of the tasks to be performed, analyze from all aspects the algorithms of the activities taking place during the combat duty, and compare, combine, assign, systematize and classify the data of all types that are measured and registered in large numbers.

But even with the utilization of all reserves, with ideal conditions for innovation and research work, as well as with the incorporation of the latest achievements in microelectronics, not all facets of the command and control system can be worked on to the necessary breadth and required depth. Common sense dictates that limits be set. For this reason, it is a time-tested practice to work closely together with the Soviet Army and the other allied armies of the member nations of the Warsaw Pact to perfect troop command and control and to constantly expand their common activity with respect to content and organization.

An experienced staff of universally trained graduate military scientists, graduate engineers, and university graduates of military and civilian institutions, as well as a large number of engineers and technicians with years of practical experience, form the basis for further intensification and rationalization tasks, which will be worked on in the air/air defense force with a view to the XII Party Congress of the SED.

Footnotes

1. E. Krenz, "Die gute Entwicklung unserer Nationalen Volksarmee ist Teil der bisher erfolgreichen Bilanz zwischen zwei Parteitagungen" [The good development of our National People's Army is a part of the thus far positive performance between two party congresses]. In: PARTEIARBEITER [Party Worker], Special Issue February 1986, p 124.

2. From the report to the XIV Delegate Conference of Party Organizations of the SED in the National People's Army and Border Troops of the GDR. In: PARTEIARBEITER, Special Issue February 1986, p 26.

3. J.-H. Strohbach, L. Thiemecke, "Untersuchungen zur Ermittlung leistungsbeeinflussender und gesundheitsbeeinträchtigender Faktoren bei ausgewählten Dienststellungen in Führungsstellen der LSK/LV" [Studies on

Determining Performance-Influencing and Health-Impairing Factors in Selected Duty Positions in Command and Control Centers of the Air/Air Defense Force]. Dissertation of the Military Medicine Academy, Bad Saarow 1988, p 161 ff.

4. PRAVDA interview with V.M. Chebrikov. In: HORIZONT [Horizon], No 10/1988, p 25.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

First Multicandidate Election in 20 Years Evaluated

24000143c Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
16 May 89 p 3

[Interview with Bohuslav Kucera, deputy chairman of the CSSR Federal Assembly; Jaroslav Jeneral, deputy manager of the CPCZ Central Committee sector; Jan Chlumsky, secretary of the Czech Election Commission of the National Front; Lubomir Horacek, secretary of the Municipal National Committee of Lysa nad Labem; Jiri Sedlacek, chairman of the Municipal Council of the National Front in Lysa na Labem; and Lubos Behalek, deputy of the Federal Assembly, by Marie Konigova and Daniela Mannova: "We Must Learn Even Democracy"; date and place not given; first paragraph is RUDE PRAVO introduction]

[Text] In late April the by-elections to our legislative assemblies were held. Incumbent deputies in 13 election districts of the Federal Assembly and of the Czech and Slovak National Council had resigned their mandates due to changes in work classification. This time 26 candidates were nominated to replace them and thus, this was a new experience. For the first time our voters were able to choose their deputies. We discussed the entire process of elections, from the beginning to the end, and their effect at a roundtable meeting with the deputy chairman of the CSSR Federal Assembly, Bohuslav Kucera; the deputy manager of the CPCZ Central Committee sector, Jaroslav Jeneral; the secretary of the Czech Election Commission of the National Front, Jan Chlumsky; representatives of the town of Lysa nad Labem, the secretary of the municipal National Council, Lubomir Horacek, and the chairman of the Municipal Council of the National Front, Jiri Sedlacek. The newly elected deputy of the Federal Assembly, Lubos Behalek, arrived from Teplice.

[RUDE PRAVO] In most election districts, there were two or three candidates for the office of deputy. In our legislature, this was the first election of this kind. Why?

[Kucera] It was prompted by the effort to test the current law of 1971 while it still is in force, and the option which it offers, namely, elections from a slate of several candidates, so that we may assess with all responsibility whether, and to what extent, should the election law be changed.

[Jeneral] This idea was a reaction to a number of suggestions and proposals from our election districts not only about the whole election system but also about some deputies to the highest legislative assemblies and about their operation. The need to improve our election system was discussed also at the 7th session of the CPCZ Central Committee; some stimuli were prompted by the preparations for elections in the USSR. As it appeared, people were more motivated by the possibility to choose

from several candidates. After all, for example, about 100,000 citizens attended the preelection rallies, which is more than twice as much as for previous by-elections.

[Sedlacek] We felt that most strongly in our town, despite some initial uncertainties. People were surprised that they would not only elect a local resident to the Federal Assembly, but that they would be able to vote for one of two candidates, 96 percent of our residents came to the polls, although the elections were held on a workday and moreover, people from our town commute far to the their workplaces.

[RUDE PRAVO] So the elections have shown that our people welcome the opportunity to choose and that they got much more involved. Since the law offers this option, why has it not been made possible much earlier?

[Kucera] Over the past 18 years I used to emphasize to our foreign guests that our laws give us the option of choosing from a slate of several candidates. However, the actual situation looked different. After broader selection, there was the presentation and nomination of a single candidate who was the joint nominee of the National Front.

[Jeneral] To make a long story short, that was simpler and easier, even though this option conformed with the law.

[RUDE PRAVO] What was the most difficult problem for the organizers of the by-elections in our communities?

[Chlumsky] They did not have enough time. The greatest burden fell on agencies on every level of the National Front as well as on the agencies of public organizations which had to make responsible ratings and selection of their candidates. Thus, for instance, in the Bruntal district public organizations submitted 24 recommendations, of which 8 were approved, and the executive board of the district council of the National Front recommended two of them to the plenum for nomination. In Trinec 3 out of 9 proposals passed.

[RUDE PRAVO] So agencies—of public organizations or of the National Front—again made the decision as to who would be the candidates. Would it not be more appropriate if members of the organizations of the National Front became more involved already during the first stage of broad selection?

[Kucera] Thus, these elections did not make that possible. Certainly, the future election system should respect the right of the voters to take an active part—I mean, those who participate in election meetings and who are really interested in electing a good deputy and in having the opportunity to express in advance their views about the candidates. Only then the agencies in charge should nominate candidates on the basis of this public opinion poll.

[RUDE PRAVO] In other words, this means that campaigns should be divided into two stages.

[Jeneral] Practically speaking, yes. Moreover, I think that in the future the first stage, when individual organizations nominate and rate their candidates, should be just as important, if not more important, than their introduction to all voters after their nomination.

We must learn even democracy. More people—the grass roots—should become involved already during the process of selection. That round will certainly lead to many proposals and one may presume that then the really best candidates will be chosen.

[Kucera] Naturally, such a challenging task will require far more time than the term allotted for these by-elections, and even more than the time for previous general elections. Therefore, a minimum period from the announcement of elections to nominations must be stipulated in the same way as the period from nominations to elections.

[RUDE PRAVO] The time for selections was too short, but so was the time for the introduction of candidates. What did individual communities do about that? How did they manage?

[Chlumsky] In most cases they managed quite well, although the organizers and candidates were under tremendous pressure. They had to attend 2 or 3 campaign rallies every day.

[RUDE PRAVO] Then such meetings were mere formalities, weren't they?

[Chlumsky] Certainly, they were mostly formalities, but I should like to remind you in particular of an experience noted by members of election commissions: The organization proposes its candidates, but then it rarely presents them at public rallies. This is the first symptom of formalism which then necessarily affects also the ensuing relations between the deputy and the organization which has nominated him. It is easy to nominate someone and then let him tell the people what kind of a man he is, what are his plans for the future, and so forth. After all, the candidate must feel certain of his support. If he gets elected, the organization must cooperate with him throughout his term in office.

[Kucera] The relation between the deputy and the nominating organization is extremely important. Thus far, it was often only a formality. Organizations nominated their candidates, someone else rated quite a few of them, and with that the responsibility of the nominating organization ended. According to the new concept, the candidates running for deputy will have to compete for their voters' trust. By the same token, it will be necessary to mobilize the nominating organization—as it were—to

fight alongside him. For that reason, I think that such a "fight" will be interesting, especially in the first round, during the primary selection, before the nomination.

[Jeneral] After all, the experience from the elections in the USSR has shown that the candidate must feel certain that the organization which has nominated him and which is interested in his victory will support him. This is quite normal and self-evident.

[RUDE PRAVO] A suggestion from the Trinec area proposed that candidates should have a kind of a staff of aides to assist them.

[Jeneral] I would not be against that if it is a staff in a good sense of that word. To be sure, it is clear that, considering the area of our election districts, no candidate can make rounds of all campaign rallies all by himself, and so precisely there representatives of the nominating organization could speak on his behalf.

Even the way the candidates are introduced should be far more congenial, so that people can learn as much as possible about them, for instance, why have they in particular been nominated.

[RUDE PRAVO] After all, this is part of the whole election campaign, it is not just a matter of preelection rallies. In some communities district press, enterprise newsletters and broadcast, and bulletin boards of public organizations have been successfully used, for example, to give the candidate maximum publicity and to acquaint the public with him.

[Horacek] Our town is small, and so we focused more on personal campaigning. We sent our delegates to public organizations and in addition, we organized two large meetings at which both candidates were introduced. Lysa has a population of 11,000; about 500 residents attended our meetings. This is quite unprecedented for by-elections, and therefore, we realize that when we shall plan the next elections, campaigning will play a far more meaningful role.

[Behalek] I can confirm that. I do not mean the introduction for the candidates per se, but mostly more information about our election system. People were often ignorant about such fundamental facts as what a deputy of the Federal Assembly actually does—and they felt that my two fellow candidates did not know it, either; they did not know at all that he is supposed to represent the interests of our whole society and discuss legal norms. Naturally, their first priority was the solution of local problems, although a deputy must fulfill the obligations of his office, proceeding from the experience from his election district.

In the Teplice area only about 5 percent of the residents attended the campaign rallies. That is not enough for the addresses of the candidates to make a real impression on

all voters. And so it is obvious that there were shortcomings in the campaign as well as in the organization of the meetings. And it is too bad that even there people did not learn the difference between individual representative bodies and the problems with which our deputies have to deal. In the end we candidates explained that. Here I see the greatest debt on the part of the organizers, and a lesson for our future elections.

We do need much more time; the campaign must be much more broad based, objective and imaginative, as far as new methods are concerned. I think that campaign rallies alone will not suffice.

[Chlumsky] According to the Czech Election Commission, the same story was repeated practically everywhere. It was only in the Klatovy and Domazlice areas that the campaign turned out to be stormier, probably because every candidate came from a different district. People regarded that as a real competition. In fact, there were posters promoting this or that candidate.

[Horacek] On the contrary, as far as we are concerned, these elections helped us literally amalgamate the population in the Mlada Boleslav area and in part of the Nymburk area—although our election district is divided into two parts. Never before have we succeeded in cooperating in such a matter of fact way.

[Kucera] I would say that the current area of our election districts is the reason why emotional and irrational factors have been introduced in the campaign. After all, one cannot vote only according to where the candidate comes from. The most important consideration should be what he can do for the whole territory and whether he will be an asset for the legislative body.

[RUDE PRAVO] What criterion helped the voters decide? It could be said that two entirely equally accomplished candidates competed in some districts. In the Mlada Boleslav area, both were chairmen of the JZD [unified agricultural cooperative], of the same age, of the same political affiliation, and with the same education. In Nitra, for instance, both candidates were employed by the same cooperative of disabled persons.

[Kucera] Obviously, in such instances voters actually picked the more presentable candidate, probably the one who was more eloquent and able to answer their questions. Unfortunately, these by-elections could not achieve what we envisaged for our future elections—that the candidates running for an office offer their own ideas about the fulfillment of election platforms. This time the candidates for deputies did not even have any impact on the drafting of election programs and now, after all, half of the election term is already behind us.

For the next term it will be extremely essential that election platforms be drafted with real cooperation of the grassroots and of organizations of the National Front, and not as in the past, mainly by the apparatus of

national committees. It is logical that even the chosen candidates be given the opportunity to express their points of view and to tackle the most crucial problems of their districts. Precisely this will be their most beneficial contribution by which they will distinguish themselves before their voters. Still, it may happen that the smoothest talking candidate—rather than the best performer—may win. However, for that we simply have no solution.

[Behalek] My campaign speeches were quite similar to those of Comrades Richterova and Tatrmus: the environment, stabilization of employees of our health services and of the educational system, comprehensive housing construction, transportation—those are the problems with which we have been dealing in the Teplice area for many years and which we still must tackle. Above all, I tried to avoid making unrealistic promises, even though people like to hear them. But what bothered me was that I could not be more specific.

[RUDE PRAVO] How did the voters let their choice be known in these elections?

[Jeneral] Well, for example, all the winners are men of approximately the same age. Not one woman has won—although there were three nominees; furthermore, there are few young people of the Youth League age. Not a single candidate over 60 years of age passed. This experience must be reviewed. We cannot afford assemblies without representatives of these groups, because our representative bodies must reflect also the structural composition of our country's population.

[Kucera] Older deputies should be included, because experience makes a deputy mature. If we overhaul our representative bodies every 5 years, their ability to act will equal zero. It takes years before a deputy of the Federal Assembly learns, for example, to serve as a control of the government and before he learns to distinguish between national interests and priorities. Therefore, I believe that experienced individuals in our public life should be involved and that administrative and official deadlines should not be imposed.

[RUDE PRAVO] One may say that thus far every minute detail of elections used to be programmed. The share of blue-collar workers, of farm workers, of women and young people was determined as some kind of a panel whose specific spots had to be filled. Will not a similar situation occur again due to the effort to have every group of our population represented?

[Kucera] It seems that we may have to follow another train of thought. The Assembly, the Czech and Slovak National Councils should not be just a sum total of deputies—no matter how excellent—elected on the basis of considerations of their districts. A certain professional structure must be stipulated because democratic decisionmaking per se always combines both the factor of democracy and to some extent, also the factor of expertise. I cannot imagine that, for instance, no lawyers and

economists would serve in our legislative assembly. Of course, we cannot see it in such a primitive form as occasionally used to appear: individual social categories were allotted to various election districts and had to be fulfilled, no matter what. This was the case of deputies who would run in a district, but work and live elsewhere—in the center. Those were our party and state officials.

[RUDE PRAVO] Deputies from individual communities were elected in these elections to replace the deputies who had resigned and all of whom were from the so called center. Does that mean that local candidates will have priority in the next elections?

[Jeneral] In my opinion, the so-called central deputies should serve in the Assembly, although it is a moot question whether as many as now.

[Kucera] However, they should work for their election district and for its benefit.

[Jeneral] I think that some of the reluctance on the part of voters to vote precisely for deputies from the center is a relic of the old, overcentralized method of management. People in our communities quite legitimately expect those deputies to fight and gain some advantages for them, because they had more opportunities to do that. But in the future we must adopt a whole concept that will offer most opportunities to those who are the closest to problems and also give them certain material, financial and legal backing. Therefore, this calls for a fair division of funds and for strictly limited processes of redistribution. Problems must be approached locally. This will also strengthen the deputy's status among his constituents.

[Kucera] In my view, we cannot have an assembly without deputies from the center. They are experienced individuals, accustomed to making decisions about problems of national importance. It would be silly to reject them—again because of some administrative measures. And if we want people to vote for them, we must work hard at it—I mean above all, to do our political work, to explain and persuade the voter why a candidate from the center should run for their election district.

[Jeneral] The experience gained during these elections shows that central deputies must also compete more and gain voters' trust, meet with them more often, and help them clarify relevant public affairs.

[RUDE PRAVO] We mentioned experience. Can it be summarized and generalized?

[Kucera] the new draft law on elections must determine the issues we are discussing. The districts with several mandates could be an answer to various problems. We cannot exclude practically anything. This is a question of thorough analyses.

[RUDE PRAVO] Still, some specific approaches proved either successful or unsuccessful. Which were they?

[Horacek] The main thing was that people got more interested in these elections.

[Chlumsky] That was because most of them welcomed the opportunity of choosing from among several candidates. But at the same time it turned out that we need much more time—much more organizational effort and campaigning—to prepare for elections.

[Kucera] We must also stop and think about the methodology for our political work. After all, we cannot engage people in a dialogue during the time after their work shift ends and before their bus leaves. As a matter of fact, the time for the presentation of the deputies in some locations was less than 30 minutes.

[Jeneral] There is plenty of time before the next elections, but we must start with preparations right now, even though the election law has not been published.

[RUDE PRAVO] Recommendations concerning elections per se, secret ballots, ballot forms and the slate of candidates are coming from many communities. For example, voters did not take advantage of voting behind a screen or of deleting one of the candidates; they thought that the candidate listed in the first spot had an edge over the others. They suggest a separate ballot for each candidate.

[Chlumsky] It is true that sometimes people would not vote behind the screen. Many refused to do so, and deleted names [on the ballot] openly. We must patiently explain to them why the method of secret ballot must be followed, since it is one of the democratic factors.

[Kucera] Opinions were voiced that it should be mandatory to make deletions on the ballot, which means to stipulate the obligation that the ballot be marked. However, let us consider the fact that some voters, especially the elderly, do not wish to alter the ballot. Then every such ballot would be invalid and results of the election would be distorted.

[Jeneral] It may be correct to stress in the new election law that an unmarked ballot means a vote for every candidate listed on it.

As these by-elections have shown, the candidates listed first do have some advantage, although not a great one, as confirmed by the fact that in one election district the candidate whose name appeared in the first spot failed to obtain the required absolute majority of votes.

[Kucera] Still another issue is under consideration for the next election—whether to hold separate elections to local bodies and to legislative assemblies. In support of that proposal is the argument that at campaign meetings this would show clearly the differences between local and

national problems. Most organizers of elections are against it because they fear that it will lead to higher costs and organizational problems.

[RUDE PRAVO] The new election law should resolve all those issues. When will it be finalized?

[Jeneral] The drafting of the political and legal principles of the new law is already underway. It should be completed in the first half of this year. Then experts from respective organizations of the National Front will express their opinion. Under consideration is the possibility of submitting the draft law for public discussion. The data gleaned from these by-elections will already be incorporated in the draft; they will be presented for discussion to the Federal Assembly and to national councils, and become part of the new election system of the CSSR.

Kraj Leading Secretary Views Restructuring in North Moravia

24000135b Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
28 Apr 89 p 3

[Interview with the leading secretary of the North Moravia Kraj Committee of the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party], Vaclav Vaclavik, by Karol Mikulka: "We Cannot Drag Our Feet"; date and place not given; first paragraph is RUDE PRAVO introduction]

[Text] The conclusions of the 12th and 13th plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee, and in particular, the decision to convene the 19th Congress of the party, motivated the communists in the North Moravia Kraj to achieve greater efficiency in their work. We discussed the main tasks of party agencies and basic organizations in that kraj with the leading secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, Comrade Vaclav Vaclavik.

[RUDE PRAVO] How would you characterize the current political atmosphere in the North Moravia Kraj and the main tasks of the kraj party organization?

[Vaclavik] The beginning of 1989 was distinctly influenced by discussions at the 12th plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee. Most of our working people—communists, members of other political parties of the National Front, and even persons without political affiliation—welcome the decision to speed up the convocation of the 18th Congress of the Party and to introduce the new economic mechanism already as of 1 January 1990. The conference which took place on 11 January 1989 in Novy Jicin with the participation of Comrade Karel Hoffman and of the delegation of the CSSR government led by Comrade Ladislav Adamec helped unify the approach of party officials and economists in our kraj to the fulfillment of the plan for 1989 and the tasks in the comprehensive restructuring of our economy.

The Proclamation of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee on the 41st Anniversary of the Victorious February activated our working people who appreciate its objective and decisive tone as well as the fact that we are not giving in to pressures from antisocialist forces. Almost 4,000 party agencies and organizations discussed the proclamation, and almost 2,500 agencies and organizations of the National Front, national committees and labor teams dealt with it. Seventy percent of the responses addressed to our party's kraj committee contained also socialist pledges to fulfill and exceed the plan for 1989.

We expect that those who thus far have not reacted to this meaningful document with specific pledges will soon do so. This is linked also with the political implementation of the plan for 1989, which was discussed at the meeting of factorywide and enterprise party committees with a unified program, at the meetings of this year's membership conferences of our basic organizations, and at recent public meetings of our party. The topics of these discussions were marked by the fact that last year in our kraj we fulfilled and overfulfilled the tasks of the state plan in profits, adjusted value added, production of goods, and other decisive indicators.

[RUDE PRAVO] Was this political effort reflected in economic results of your kraj in the first quarter of this year?

[Vaclavik] In the first quarter of this year profits in industrial enterprises in our kraj were exceeded by Kcs 335 million, and adjusted value added by Kcs 210 million. Agriculture, food industry, and enterprises managed by national committees are meeting their assigned tasks. Labor productivity in adjusted value added was 102.3 percent fulfilled and its semiannual increase was 3.4 percent.

Nevertheless, despite many good achievements, we do not have the least reason to feel pleased. In their fulfillment of the plan for the first quarter, many enterprises achieved a very low share of their annual tasks and thus, failed to meet the objectives adopted by our CPCZ Central Committee. In adjusted value added, for instance, Tesla in Trinec, Optima in Odry, Vagonka in Studenka, Chronotechna in Sternberk, the Klement Gottwald Iron Works in Vitkovice and Metallurgical Assemblies in Ostrava, Engineering Works in Prerov, Moravian Electric Appliances Plants in Postrelmov, Sigma in Olomouc, and other enterprises have not fulfilled the required 26 percent. A similar development which leads to an irregular fulfillment of the annual plan is evident in other indicators as well. In our kraj 16 enterprises have not fulfilled the specifications for the deliveries of consumer goods for the market. The most blatant discrepancies appear in Plastic Compactors in Vrbno, in Moravia in Marianske Udoli, Velamos in Sobotin, Zbrojovka in Vsetin, and Loana in Roznov. Inventories in several enterprises are oversupplied, and about one-third of our enterprises have not maintained the planned proportion between the growth of labor productivity and the growth of wages.

[RUDE PRAVO] How do you intend to resolve these problems?

[Vaclavik] The critical review of economic results presented by Comrade Milos Jakes in his report at the 13th plenum of the party's central committee applies to us, too. We discussed these issues at the consultation of the leading secretaries of the CPCZ okres committees and adopted necessary corrective measures. Directors of enterprises which fail to meet their tasks will have to render regular accounts at meetings of the executive committees of the party's okres committee.

It is important to realize that by fulfilling tasks for this year and for the entire Eighth 5-Year Plan we are creating conditions for a successful process of restructuring and for a dynamic development in the Ninth 5-Year Plan. After all, we must not drag our feet. Progress will come only through diligent, better and more organized efforts. For example, enterprises themselves report that they are using only 90 percent of their work time. Estimates by objective authorities are even more skeptical—80 percent in industry, about 60 to 70 percent in construction, and 50 percent in offices and institutes. Clearly, the poor standard of management is to blame.

Particularly serious is the fact that no progress to speak of has been achieved in enterprise subdivision management. It still is burdened by excessive bureaucracy in which direct management of production, authority and responsibility of individual managing factors, and effective control are all lost. We still see efforts by higher echelons of management to monopolize the right of decisionmaking even in cases where lower levels may be fully competent to make decisions. Due confidence is not shown to individuals to whom we have entrusted the management of enterprises—masters, foremen, chiefs of operations, and directors of enterprises. Then the managing personnel often spends more time on operations than on conceptual approaches and does not pay proper attention to the implementation of R&D achievements, innovations of products, and reduction of total costs. In conjunction with the restructuring, all these issues must be unconditionally on the daily agenda.

[RUDE PRAVO] You mention the restructuring. How do you rate its progress in the North Moravia Kraj thus far?

[Vaclavik] We gained the support and almost unanimous approval of the ideas of restructuring, and the understanding that we must seek more efficient forms and methods of work in every area of our society's life and strengthen the characteristics of socialist democracy in our life.

The address of Comrade Milos Jakes at the 13th plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee met with the most favorable response from the party's basic organizations. At the same time, the polls conducted by the kraj party committee have shown that our working people are not overly enthusiastic about the progress of the restructuring. They expect faster changes in their workplace and in

their communities, and specific improvements of their living standard. This information is extremely relevant because it reflects the fact that we had begun the restructuring of organizational structures in our economy while the old economic mechanism and the original processes of redistribution were still in force. Consequently, most working people cannot yet envisage the impact of the planned new economic mechanism, self-financing and full enterprise-subdivision *khozraschet* in their workplace, and in particular, the necessary change in their own attitude to work. Thus, they cannot properly appreciate the purpose of the elections to self-management councils and to offices of directors of new state enterprises.

[RUDE PRAVO] Does that cause more essential problems?

[Vaclavik] Thus far, 168 state enterprises have been founded in our kraj. When selecting delegates to the assemblies and candidates for the office of director, it frequently happens that individuals chosen from the professional standpoint are those with experience with the old economic mechanism but about whom no one can say with any assurance that they will succeed with the new mechanism. Particularly when electing delegates to the assemblies, prevalent are formalistic points of view and often also the opinion that the delegates should be able—to use the vernacular—hustle for their workplace. Naturally, when it concerns candidates for the office of director, we also consider political criteria, and here it appears that when electing demanding, energetic and conscientious managers, we clash with an assembly of delegates who are unprepared to accept and elect such managerial executives.

One must quite seriously recognize the fact that every well functioning economy is based on discipline and order. It is wrong if managers who follow scrupulous criteria when rating employees' performance and whose methods of management are modern and rational have to worry about their livelihood. Even this fact must be emphasized. We cannot lose our best managerial cadres in this process. Every work team must realize that.

[RUDE PRAVO] These issues have also been discussed at the 13th session of the CPCZ Central Committee. What does it augur for the North Moravia Kraj?

[Vaclavik] Recently the executive council of the party's kraj committee assessed with the greatest concern and criticism the process of the second stage in the founding of state enterprises. It agreed that before we enter the rest of the second stage and especially before we begin the third stage, we must learn lessons from the events which accompanied the elections in the syndicates Ostrok, North Moravia Breweries, Geodezia, and some others. Our experience clearly proves that in several instances the founders failed to master their part. In general, all

they did was introduce the candidates for the office of director and especially in large state enterprises they underestimated the danger of inflaming local interests.

They are not at all dealing with such issues as explaining the long-range objectives of the enterprise and planning for its transition to self-financing by means of total khozraschet; in some cases, they have not resolved even problems facing the enterprise because of the ministry's past policies. In difficult circumstances, as for instance in the Ostrava-Karvina Mines, they are not able even to find correct direction and to react promptly and with all necessary force.

We cannot tolerate such a situation silently, because this development verges on arbitrariness and could lead to unforeseeable political consequences.

[RUDE PRAVO] How are our party officials playing their part?

[Vaclavik] It appears that in the cases I mentioned even okres, enterprise and factorywide CPCZ committees failed to grasp the situation and in their attempt painstakingly to follow some kind of democratization, they succumbed to opportunistic alibism and even tolerated manifestations of local and group interests. In some cases careerism also came into play. Therefore, one must realize that elections to offices in self-management and to managerial positions must unite communists and not lead to their ideological division and splintering into various special-interest factions.

The third stage in the founding of stage enterprises is already the most plagued with problems. Now, at preliminary negotiations, it is clear that we cannot tolerate a situation where the ministries suddenly, from one day to another, stopped to perform their managing function and expected that enterprises themselves would resolve the accumulated problems caused by the ministries' poor management over the past period.

Comrade Milos Jakes referred to this at the 13th session of the CPCZ Central Committee. We agree with the view that our economy cannot be crumbled up by bureaucracy into many small enterprises. On the other hand, we cannot "preserve" economic production units which for some time have demonstrably failed to manage their enterprises and which are incapable of resolving their problems. The most blatant example of that are the General Engineering Plants in Brno and its enterprises in our kraj. This year again enterprises of that economic production unit reported the highest unfulfilled specifications of their plan of profit—namely, Zbrojovka in Vsetin Kcs 288 million, Meopta in Prerov with Kcs 102 million, and Moravia in Mariánské Lázně with Kcs 86 million. We notified central authorities on a number of occasions that we are concerned about attempts to retain this economic production unit, and we shall again bring this issue before the party's central committee.

[RUDE PRAVO] Are there some other pitfalls?

[Vaclavik] Significantly enough, impressions have arisen that the restructuring ends with elections of officials for self-management and of directors for state enterprises. We have enterprises in our kraj which correctly understand that the restructuring is a long-range process that must be approached conceptually. I can mention the North Moravia Cellulose Plants in Paskov, the Ostrava-Karvina Power Plants, the Tatra in Kopřivnice, the Great October Socialist Revolution Iron Works in Trinec, and others. However, in most cases the managing sphere both in enterprises and factories as well as in national committees, and services would not be sufficiently mobilized because of the force of inertial of thinking and habits which the managers acquired in the years of the extensive development and bureaucratic and authoritarian method of management. This resulted in many indecisions, hesitations and unwillingness to tackle problems and to assume personal responsibility for decisions. Managing staffs are engaged more in discussions than in work with their teams, and consequently, it is no wonder that the positive effect of the restructuring thus far has been felt only very faintly.

[RUDE PRAVO] Certainly, these are very serious facts and experiences. How does the North Moravia Kraj CPCZ Committee intend to change this situation?

[Vaclavik] The new role played by the political leadership of our party agencies and organizations must be correctly understood. They cannot serve some kind of "make-weight" for the economic management; they must be the real political core of labor teams, to which the communists in management positions must render accounts. Party agencies and organizations must be consistent in enforcing the right of control.

We must put an end to the situation where party agencies and organizations talk about "long unresolved," "chronic" or "repeated" problems and shortcomings. Such generalities conceal an impermissibly liberal attitude toward specific individuals responsible for such shortcomings and unresolved problems. If a party agency or organization keeps incompetent managers in office, it objectively degrades the party's authority in workplaces. For that purpose we also intend to use our meetings with party members as much as possible. This must lead to their further activation and to specific tasks to correct above all the shortcomings and problems in workplaces. Furthermore, this is an area where the officials of trade unions and youth organizations must get going.

It is absolutely necessary to stop avoiding conflicts and to get rid of opportunism, liberalism and hypocrisy. Every worker, for instance, should be bluntly told whether he works well or whether he does not. We cannot permit a situation where managers are unwilling to sign a pledge for work teams pledging that trouble-free, uninterrupted work; this unwillingness prevents in

many cases the creation of team form of labor organization and the increase of rewards. It also prevents enterprise subdivision *khozraschet* from expanding, and obstructs the restructuring whose success is the vital task of each of us, and the order of the day.

[RUDE PRAVO] We thank you for the interview.

Forced Labor Seen as Answer to Recidivism
24000143a Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
17 May 89 p 3

[Article by Jaroslav Bajer, LLD, district prosecutor in Jihlava: "Current Legal Measures Are Inadequate"]

[Text] One of the main duties of agencies in charge of criminal proceedings, i.e., the SNB [National Security Corps], prosecutors and courts, is to fight against criminal elements. This means above all to take action against offenders who systematically commit criminal acts, who avoid honest work and who obtain the means of their support, as the criminal law states, in illegal ways to the detriment of our whole society.

They include all kinds of parasites, thieves and swindlers who exploit the achievement of honest people's labor and whose way of life only harms our society. With few exceptions, the penalties imposed by the court do not meet their intended purpose, and furthermore, preventive supervision ordered as a rule by the court fails to bring the success envisaged by the law. After they are released from prison, these criminals in their overwhelming majority soon resume their felonious activities and refuse every and so called postpenitentiary care offered them by social services; they defy them or use them to collect one-time benefits in the form of cash loans which they often never repay.

It is my personal conviction that our current legal measures cannot remedy this problem. I think that the situation to which I should like to call attention will deteriorate into an even more serious problem when some of the economic standards will be implemented in the restructuring process. After these individuals return from prison, they must be offered a chance at honest work, and therefore, our economic organizations are hiring them often explicitly upon the pressure from social services. That is their legal obligation even today. However, it may be logically assumed that our organizations will soon categorically refuse to employ such persons, although thus far they have to provide them with housing and assist them financially, and offer them every opportunity to earn an honest living. Labor teams are trying to retrain them, and members of public organizations, who volunteered for this task and who have achieved in some cases their intended objective, are trying to reeducate them.

Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of these criminal elements enjoy liberty only briefly and then they return

again to the thick walls of prisons from which they were recently released. I do not think that it is realistic to expect that reeducation by the above-mentioned teams, in other words, laymen, will succeed in reforming repeatedly convicted criminals, if highly experienced experts, members of the Correctional Training Corps, and all those psychologists working with such prisoners during their incarceration failed in their attempts to retrain them under far different and more auspicious circumstances.

I believe it imperative to begin the process of reeducation of these individuals in some labor institutions where they would undergo further occupational therapy after completing their sentence. Obviously, this would be one of the few options that may force them to repay our society at least a small part of the losses which many of them have been causing for a number of years. Not only members of agencies engaged in criminal prosecution, but all those who have peace, order and security of our republic at heart, have been calling for long years for such an institution. Naturally, it will require a pertinent legal amendment.

This problem goes hand in hand with another, no less serious problem—preventive treatment of alcoholism, either ambulatory or institutional, which alcoholics would undergo, usually pursuant to the court decision, especially if tried for criminal acts prompted by preceding consumption of alcoholic beverages, or those whose excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages, results in criminal activity. Because alcoholism is considered a disease, they in fact are patients entitled to all legal rights, among them to receive payments of disability benefits.

Our society expends considerable financial funds for preventive antialcoholic therapy of persons addicted to excessive intake of alcohol. According to physicians specializing in such therapy, six months of antialcoholic treatment in an institution costs almost Kcs 100,000 per alcoholic. Because with rare exception such treatments usually fail to achieve desired results, this is in fact a waste of money which could be put, especially at present, to some better use. My personal opinion is that the achievements of this compulsory treatment are generally overrated and it seems that even health authorities in charge may harbor completely fallacious ideas about it.

The success of preventive antialcoholic therapy in any form depends, and always will depend, on the determination of the alcoholic himself and it may achieve the desired result only if the decision to undergo such therapy is voluntary, spontaneous and goal oriented; it should be added, that this treatment is very time consuming. It is decisively quite hopeless in cases of chronic alcoholics whom court decisions force to submit to such a treatment because it is obvious that such individuals would never resort to it of their own volition. As for the long-term treatment, which is the main requisite of its success, it will demand substantially higher costs, but again, there is no guarantee that it will prove successful.

I am working in the office of the district prosecutor in Jihlava, in whose district is located a psychiatric clinic. It

provides preventive antialcoholic treatment for these patients, about which I gathered extensive information and practical experience. Due to shortages of beds in our antialcoholic hospitals and because of the large numbers of alcoholics sentenced to undergo this treatment, the hospital administration usually proposes after 3 months of therapy that the treatment be continued on an out-patient basis. The court accepts such recommendations because according to the statement of physicians in charge, institutional therapy already fulfilled its stated purpose. It is hardly exceptional for alcoholics who are supposed to continue as out patients to go straight into a bar as soon as they leave the treatment center. It is quite common for these "patients" during their treatment in the institution to take advantage of their outings and visits of their relatives and friends to consume alcoholic beverages and then return to the institution intoxicated. The court prosecutes and convicts them again for that. Many of them have undergone this treatment repeatedly—always with the same result.

You would embarrass physicians-psychiatrists who are treating alcoholics convicted by court, if you would ask them how many of their patients have really been cured. Of course, one must add here that the physicians are not to be blamed for the lack of therapeutic success but rather the method of therapy and the conditions provided for it are to blame. This has been going on for many years, but the authorities in charge, who certainly must be aware of the whole situation, have not taken any action. What kind of action? Let experts make that decision. The current method of expensive, but unsuccessful therapy should be discontinued. As I have noted before, a great number of these alcoholics are criminal elements, dodgers and recidivists who are a burden to our society.

I am not so much against their treatment, only against its ineffective methods applied for a long time, despite the fact that it is extremely costly and judging from its results, completely wasteful.

I believe that as with the proposed method of retraining the recidivists and incorrigible criminal elements, it is absolutely necessary to adopt a similar appropriate method of therapy also in the case of these alcoholics. This will be achieved in special hospital-type institutions and rehabilitation centers where all these individuals would be retrained following appropriate and above all, effective methods. The sooner such institutions are accepted, the better. They will prevent further losses and needless financial expenditures which our society has to pay for such purposes.

HUNGARY

Entrepreneurs' Economic Program Announced
*25000263a Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in
Hungarian 6 May 89 p 8*

[Text] Growing dissatisfaction in society, clashes, strikes, insolvency and the collapse of the economy: This

is the kind of landslide the National Association of Entrepreneurs [VOSZ] predicts in the short term unless a comprehensive program to invigorate the economy replaces the restrictive course. It issued this statement at a forum which marked the first time that the Association discussed its economic policy theses. Last week's exchange of minds will be followed by 18 conferences in large cities throughout the country before the end of May.

The entrepreneurs envision the stimulation of domestic consumption as the primary means by which to invigorate the economy. The inventory of goods freed up as a result of the drastic discouragement of consumption is only a temporary semblance of a success brought on by present economic management, according to the group.

The presentations of both university professor Tamas Bacsikai and VOSZ president Janos Palotas, as well as participants in the ensuing debate voiced the feeling that in casting off its earlier political role the entrepreneurial sector is increasingly serving as a milking cow. Correspondingly, along with other measures, the Association envisions the chances of evolution through the moderation of the tax burden borne by entrepreneurs. VOSZ recommends a uniform 30-percent progressive personal income tax, an increase of the tax-exempt threshold to 70,000 forints, reduction of general sales tax rates from 25 to 17 percent (and within that the classification of some of the products not subject to sales taxes into a category subject to an 8 percent sales tax in order to reduce the shortage of budgetary revenues), reduction of profit taxes to a uniform 30 percent level, a 50 to 70 percent reduction in production subsidies, and a reduction of social security and pension contributions to a uniform 27 and 6 percent respectively.

It was revealed at the forum that in the Association's judgment the small entrepreneurial sector's concerns cannot be resolved without curing the people's economy's problems in general. The Association stressed that for this reason that it was not limiting its program to reflect entrepreneurial concerns only. The VOSZ presidium views as untenable the approach by which concern for a balanced budget supersedes everything else. VOSZ is convinced that a significant part of the indebtedness should be paid for on the basis of publicly owned assets, such as the sale of notes signifying the indebtedness, and the sale of enterprises, equipment used for production as well as land. It envisions the basic conditions for attracting foreign capital in the development of the transportation, communication and information infrastructure, rather than in granting tax benefits. The infrastructural development should be implemented on a commercial basis, along with incentives received from the state.

In conclusion it said that the alternative economic policy concept presented by VOSZ and submitted for debate requires new policies and a new economic management team.

POLAND

Krakow Seeks Unconventional Solutions in Special Zoning Status

26000500b Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
8 May 89 pp 1-2

[Article by Edward Gretschel: "Krakow Does Not Want To Become a Skansen"]

[Text] Scientists and practitioners agree that the future form of Krakow's economy should be decided—within the framework of the new economic order—by a special economics zone.

Says Dr Jozef Gajewicz, first secretary of the party's Krakow Committee, "We want to comprehensively, decisively and energetically break the barriers of incapability, gradually solve the accumulated, over the years, problems of the Krakow urban center. The initiatives of the Society for the Support of Economic Initiatives, the Krakow Industrial Society, 'Krakow'89' functioning in the Polish Academy of Sciences, and other organizations, should aid in this work. They should hasten and facilitate the competition of new economic ventures, create strong incentives for foreign capital, and bring about changes in the climate surrounding the activities of domestic and foreign enterprises. In order to do this, the restructurization of Krakow's industry must be accelerated and a municipal and servicing infrastructure made up of a network of roads, highways and new hotels, must be developed..."

This is to be, therefore, a specially privileged area for all economic organizations operating within the zone. The legal, financial, tax and economic regulations in effect in this zone will not be the same as universally applied. The goal of the zone is to make the best possible utilization of the economic potential already available and the restructuring of the existing industry so as to develop electronics, automation, computer science, industrial robotics, precision instruments, and other industries which require a high degree of processing and high technology, in conformance with primary ecological criteria.

Environment and Science

"Krakow cannot be saved today simply through restructuring," explains the PZPR voivodship committee first secretary. "We must work very fast, because each year it comes more difficult to make up the losses, especially in the city's antiquities. We must form an industrial lobby for those branches which are the least damaging to the environment. I am referring not only to electronics and computer science, or the precisions instruments industry, but also to consultation, marketing management, medical services, and therapeutic services..."

The zone, as an unconventional solution, should be based on the achievements of Krakow's science, whose enormous potential known and esteemed throughout the world does not contribute very much to the development

of the country's economy. In turn, the attracting of foreign capital and free foreign-exchange turnovers, and a conservative tax policy, would become a strong incentive for investment and export.

The experience of many countries in the world, which have similar zones, shows incontrovertibly, that not only would the economy of the city develop, but also the entire larger region, and that the neighboring voivodships would become more active. In the light of Poland's current economic situation, the creation of a special economic zone appears to be fully justified, as the current elections campaign for the Sejm and the senate confirms.

New Awareness

"At the moment the zone is formed," explains Jozef Gajewicz, "Krakow will be able to afford to exist and function without central subsidies. All that is needed is the indispensable powers and the city will be able to deal with restructurization, environmental protection, tourism, culture and investment, itself. I will also say that Krakow will become a kind of Polish window on the world through which foreign capital, modern technology and a new economic awareness of the Poles will flow.

This joint economic interest, leading to structural changes in Krakow's industry, based on international trade contacts and high technology, will be a 'technological adaptation' of the Polish economy in the 21st century."

Free Trade Zone

The game for the future of Krakow will be played also on the outskirts of the city near the airport in Balice where a free trade zone is being planned. It will be an integral part of the overall economic zone. Modernization and expansion of the airport was begun in early May. In the presence of the managing director of Polish Airports, Stanislaw Czarny, city-government representatives together with the contractors examined the possibility of shortening the work to 18 months.

The new port (modernization will cost 1.5 billion zlotys) will be able to receive 400,000 passengers per year and four aircraft simultaneously late next year. The tarmac and the runways will be rebuilt. The main building, which will be modern, made of glass and steel, will contain high-grade electronics equipment. Representatives of several foreign companies from Italy and the FRG have expressed their readiness to cooperate.

The idea of the Krakow economic experiment, developed during various discussions and described in scientific reports, has received the broad support of the city's people's council. It will be subjected to an objective analysis by the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers (KERM) at a field meeting on 10 May. We will soon learn whether the Krakow specialists, scientists and managers are able to convince the representatives of KERM that they are right.

ROMANIA

Reaction of Population to 1977, 1986 Earthquakes Studied

27000070 *Bucharest VIITORUL SOCIAL in Romanian Nov-Dec 88 pp 507-519*

[Article by Dorel Abraham: "The Sociology of Disasters and Interdisciplinary Research of Earthquakes"]

[Excerpts]

[Passage omitted]

Multidisciplinary Research on Earthquakes in Romania

Seismic activity in our country is characterized by a series of reoccurring violent earthquakes. More than half the country's population lives in seismic regions where the great urban centers are concentrated (including the capital), as is much of the country's industry. The last two large earthquakes (1977 and 1986) and especially the one of 4 March 1977—which was, as it has been described in geological literature, a major seismic event—underscored the need for the expeditious preparation of a social response in case of a disastrous earthquake. This response should aim for maximum efficiency regarding the avoidance or minimization of loss of life and property. A study of the effects of the 1977 earthquake (St. Balan, V. Critescu, I. Cornea, 1982) demonstrated that from a technical point of view, there has been good antiseismic protection over the past two decades, with good antiearthquake design in construction (new buildings which adhered to antiseismic codes did not collapse during the last two earthquakes). However, the study did show the need for more research in other elements of society's response to a disaster. Primarily this finding referred to public preparation for earthquakes as well as other aspects regarding urban vulnerability and seismic planning, organizing relief efforts in the event of a disaster etc. Sociological research that was relatively organized concerning the social issues of a disaster began in Romania after 1977 (in the wake of the March quake) by the Laboratory of Sociological Study and Research.

There was concern regarding the sociology of disasters even earlier, especially after the floods of 1970, in the form of either presentations (Henri H. Stahl, 1970-72) or in written works (Petre Datculescu, 1973). However this type of scientific approach, which was important for consolidating this area of sociology, was more theoretical than practical.

Sociological research in the field was prompted by the impact of the two great earthquakes of 4 March 1977 and 31 August 1986. The approach of this research was to study the social response to an earthquake. The research was carried out along two primary lines and went through a number of stages.

The first line of research pursued an understanding of principles concerning the popular behavior in the event of an earthquake. Attention was given to preimpact, impact and postimpact behavior.

Behavioral field studies were carried out in Zimnicea (a small city with a population of about 14,000 which lost 80 percent of its buildings in the 1977 earthquake¹ and in Bucharest immediately after the 1986 earthquake.²

The second line of research concerned the study of postearthquake reconstruction and development processes.

To better understand the way in which systematization and reconstruction of localities was performed in localities after the earthquake, field research was carried out in the period 1983-84 (6 to 7 years after the disastrous earthquake) in five urban localities significantly affected by the earthquake: Bucharest, Craiova, Ploiesti, Valenii de Muntea and Zimnicea. Furthermore, to provide certain basic elements of a code of "antiseismic urbanism" a Delphi-type study was carried out in three stages through the cooperation of 27 experts (in the first phase, the number of participants was larger) from the IPCT and other research, design and training units in Bucharest, Cluj, Iasi and Timisoara.³

Since the results concerning postearthquake community antiseismic systematization, rebuilding, reconstruction and development have been the subject of other publications (D. Abraham, Al. Floroan 1984; D. Abraham, A. Cristescu, Georgeta Gheorghe, M. Kivu 1985; D. Abraham, S. Georgescu, 1988) within this article we will address certain results concerning the behavior of the population in cases of earthquake. We will give primary emphasis to the research carried out after the earthquake of 31 August 1986, during the period 8-14 September. This was based on a questionnaire comprised of queries principally concerning the behavior and reactions during and immediately after the quake of the people interviewed, compared with those of the earlier great earthquakes in 1940 and 1977 (when possible), the reasons for the behavior, how the individual discovered what was happening, the type of building in which the subject was located at the instant of the quake, an evaluation of the duration and intensity of the quake compared with the earlier ones, and opinions concerning preparedness for earthquakes.⁴

Behavioral Characteristics Just Before Impact

The great majority of the population (over 80 percent) interviewed was at home at the moment the quake began (this was due to the late hour—28 minutes after midnight). A significant portion of the population (36 percent) experienced the same instant before the March 1977 earthquake in their same (current) home.

Only a very few (about 10 percent) of the population studied were alone at the moment of impact, the majority being at home with the spouse and/or children. Approximately 20 percent were in larger family settings or with friends.

At the particular moment, even though it was the middle of the night, only 55 percent of the population studied were asleep, about a quarter were involved in household activities, about 18 percent were involved in entertainment or cultural pursuits, and about 1 percent were on the road.

The great majority of the people interviewed (89 percent) knew from the very first indications of the impact that it was an earthquake. Nonetheless, about 9 percent were not sure or were mistaken at the outset about what was happening. Some thought it was a storm (thunder) or vibrations caused by machinery, an explosion etc. A small percentage (2 percent) slept through the first part of the earthquake, being awakened and informed by members of the family about what had transpired. It was discovered that the population did have time to take preliminary measures for protection during the earthquake.

Behavior During the Earthquake

During the short period that the earthquake lasted (the strong portion of the quake which was apparent) the great majority of the population remained indoors (about 86 percent). Nonetheless, about 10 percent of the population questioned stated that they succeeded in getting outside of the buildings and 2 percent moved to stairwells, to neighbors or on balconies. A comparison with the behavior of the Japanese population of the city of Elbin during the earthquake of 1968 which measured 6.1 on the Richter scale, showed that during that quake, approximately 39 percent of the 500 people interviewed said that they had fled their homes (it is true that afterward, about 400 of the homes were totally destroyed).

Reactions during the earthquake of 1986 is significantly different from that during the 1977 earthquake when 37 percent of the population fled outdoors (at that time 56 percent of the people questioned were at home.) Furthermore, about 40 percent of those interviewed felt that they had acted differently during the two quakes. Comparatively speaking, the behavior of persons during the 1986 and 1940 earthquakes (for those who experienced both) differed even more; the percentage in 1940 who ran outdoors reached 60 percent. Thus one can see a trend for the population to remain indoors during an earthquake, which for persons living in collective dwellings, is a positive aspect, derived from previous experiences.

Among those who remained indoors during the 1986 quake, about 60 percent attempted to protect themselves, standing under a door frame or along reinforced

walls. Still, about 40 percent waited out the immediate impact of the earthquake without taking any action, since, in fact, they did not know what to do. Among families, in over 60 cases, all family members behaved the same but in 28 percent of the cases, they reacted differently.

The reasons for remaining indoors during the earthquake were not however, the same in all cases. Most (40 percent) said that the main reason was fear or the risk of accidents, others knew that it was neither necessary or good to go outdoors during an earthquake (24 percent), about 20 percent felt that it would have been impossible to go outdoors and about 3 percent said they had to stay indoors to help other members of the family.

For their part, those who went outdoors during the earthquake gave the following reasons for their behavior: fear, avoiding collapse, and concern for others who were outdoors. The great majority left buildings by stairway (no one took the elevator) which was different from the 1977 quake, or straight outdoors for those who had homes with yards.

Behavior in the postseismic period—What did people do immediately after the earthquake?

Immediately after the earthquake about 70 percent of the people interviewed said that they went outdoors and about 17 percent remained indoors and tried to use the telephone or listen to the radio. Only about 10 percent of the population did not go outdoors at all during the night after the earthquake.

Those who remained indoors after the earthquake felt that there was no danger and wanted to avoid the panic (to these, we add those who wanted to listen to the radio or who had succeeded in using the telephone or who simply had to take care of other people.)

Most of those who went outdoors during the earthquake (about 60 percent) took nothing with them. However, a good percentage did take various items with them such as documents, money, keys (25 percent), clothes, provisions, precious objects and so on (7 percent).

The behavior of those who went outdoors either during or after the quake varied widely. More than half of them stayed in the vicinity of their homes or buildings. About 20 percent walked or rode to visit friends or relatives in the area. Others (about 10 percent) moved to open spaces. There were other situations for those who left the immediate neighborhoods (1 percent), who stayed in their own cars (2 percent) or who left for work etc.

In general there was group behavior (80 percent of the groups were family groups and about 20 percent were groups which formed of friends, neighbors or were ad hoc.) Only 10 percent did not participate in group behavior.

During the time that they remained outdoors (the time varied from over 2 hours in 35 percent of the cases, between 1-2 hours for over 25 percent of the population, and under 1 hour (40 percent), a large number of them (about 35 percent) returned to their homes during this time. Most returned to get clothes or other necessities, some (5 percent) to check for damage, others to use the telephone, to see what other family members were doing etc.

The reasons why people went outdoors after the earthquake were somewhat different from those who went outdoors during the quake. Thus, 32 percent of the population studied said they went outdoors to avoid possible follow-on tremors. Among the other reasons given frequently by those who went outdoors after the quake are: fear (about 25 percent), desire to inspect for damage to the building (12 percent), concern for others (11 percent), at the urging of others in the house (7 percent) and curiosity to see what had happened outdoors (5 percent) etc.

Compared with the 1977 behavior after the earthquake, the same dominant motives were offered by the majority of the people in both situations for the population who went outdoors (or who were outdoors at the time in 1977 and did not immediately go back indoors). Thus, most felt that they had acted the same way in 1986 as they had in 1977 although there was a significant percentage of people (36 percent) who felt that they had reacted differently.

Exiting homes after the earthquake was, in a majority of cases, by stairways. However, as opposed to the behavior during the earthquake, about 6 percent did use elevators to leave their buildings.

Compared with 1940, for those who experienced both, most in this category (60 percent) said that they reacted differently in 1986 after the earthquake.

Social contacts, compared with normal times, was much more intense in the period immediately following the quake. First of all, family members who were not with the subject interviewed were sought after (40 percent of cases), then relatives in the same area or who lived away (20 percent), and finally friends and neighbors (10 percent). Of all those interviewed, only about 9 percent did not look for anyone immediately after the quake.

Similarly, the first persons who made contact with those interviewed after the quake were members of the family who were not with them at the time, then relatives, neighbors or friends.

Among the means used to make contact after the quake by the persons questioned, the telephone was most frequently employed (although it did not work immediately after the quake) being used by 55 percent. Other important means for visiting were private cars (8 percent) or on foot (7 percent). About 11 percent of those

interviewed were not able to find out anything about those in whom they were interested in the first hour after the quake, nor did any of these find out anything about those who were the object of their concern for 2-3 hours after the quake.

Comparative Evaluation of the 1986 Earthquake's Effects

Although the vast majority of the population realized immediately that it was an earthquake, opinions of its duration varied widely.

Only about one third of the persons studied had a fairly accurate appreciation of the earthquake's duration, which was between 45 and 60 seconds. About 20 percent underestimated the duration of the quake and about half of the population overestimated this period. About 9 percent of the surveyed population felt that the quake lasted over 3 minutes.

Compared with the 1977 earthquake (which was, in fact, more powerful and lasted longer), the people interviewed had varying ideas concerning the duration and strength of the 31 August 1986 quake. There was one category which felt that it was weaker or of shorter duration (about 30 percent), another which felt it was stronger or longer lasting (10 percent), and a third which felt it was about the same in strength and duration (about 35 percent). The remainder said they could not compare them.

Psychologically the impact varied. An analysis of the elements which produced the strongest reaction among those interviewed listed the most important as: the noise generated (40 percent), the heaving and shaking of the buildings (14 percent), the image created (17 percent), the reactions of other people (8 percent), these three (sic) elements combined (12 percent). After the earthquake, most impressive were people's reactions (38 percent), the fear of more quakes (7 percent) and the damage produced (5 percent). Over 55 percent of the people interviewed felt that there was much more fear than in 1977, a plausible fact if we view events in light of the overestimation of the earthquake's duration and strength compared with that of 1977 by a significant portion of the population. The majority of those interviewed said that they were most afraid during the most intense part of the earthquake while 14 percent identified the most fear at the quake's first signs. The majority (80 percent) felt that the mental health of those who experienced the quake did not suffer. About 18 percent indicated social shock and about 2 percent had nervous problems or heart palpitations which required medical attention.

On the material side, about one third of the population interviewed suffered personal material damages from the August 1986 earthquake in the form of cracked walls, stoves, the destruction of personal items etc.

Very few (about 10 percent) had taken steps in the home's interior prior to the quake to avoid material damages (about 9 percent had arranged their furniture to this end). Furthermore, the majority of those who had material losses did not know how they could have been avoided, although about 5 percent indicated this could have been achieved through placement of various objects in the house to avoid damage.

Information About the Earthquake

About half of the population interviewed felt that they did have, in advance, some knowledge about earthquakes and how people were supposed to act in such a situation. The means, then, that 10 years after this population experienced a disastrous earthquake, almost half of them were unsure of the specifics (which, we believe, was a factor in the fear and the overestimation of the earthquake's duration).

Immediately after the earthquake, because of a lack of official information, very few people (less than 3 percent) were able to find out anything in the first hours after the quake concerning its intensity and duration, the fact that there was not serious damage etc. About 65 percent learned different information beginning the next morning (after 5-6 hours).

The majority (65 percent) used the radio as the principal source of information, although unofficial means through direct discussions or over the telephone with others were used by about 20 percent of those interviewed.

Asked about what they believe should be known prior to an earthquake, 80 percent of those interviewed felt that there must be much more information concerning: what one should do during and immediately after an earthquake, the safest spot in the building where one lives, whether earthquakes can be prevented etc.

An awareness of the danger which can result from an earthquake is reflected in the fact that more than 7 percent of those interviewed have decided to move to another location and another 15 percent have considered moving, although only under certain conditions. Of course, these responses were given during the first two weeks after the earthquake.

Principles avenues of action based on these studies for preparing the population for earthquakes refer to: the synthesized information considered necessary for people to have in order to avoid loss of life and to minimize property damage; and recommendations concerning what people should do before, during and after an earthquake to be prepared for such a disaster.

These actions should be integrated into a general program for the social response to an earthquake.

[passage omitted]

Footnotes

1. Field investigations in Zimnicea (1977) were carried out jointly by the sociologists Georgeta Gheorghe and Mircea Kivu from the Laboratory of Sociological Studies and the sociologist Gheorghe Nicolae from the Center of Sociological Studies.

2. 1986 research, which was broader based, consisted of interviews with 272 people living in different types of buildings in Bucharest (houses with yards and a cottage to apartment blocs up to four stories high and even higher) which made use of a questionnaire and interview guide and which were carried out by members of the Laboratory of Sociological Studies in the framework of a coordinated thesis by the author of this study.

3. These studies were carried out as a part of a theme plan by the sociologists Dorel Abraham, Georgeta Gheorghe, Alexandru Florian, Mihai Milca and Mircea Kivu.

4. The characteristics of the population studied: by sex—60 percent female and 40 percent male; the medium age of those interviewed was 41 years, with more emphasis on older groups with more experience rather than youth under 30; and as a function of profession, 20 percent were laborers, 30 percent were midlevel administrators, technicians, draftsmen etc., 37 percent professional cadre with advanced education (engineers, architects, economists etc.), 10 percent housewives and retired persons and 5 percent pupils and students.

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